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UNDER AN UNSTARRY SKY:
KANTIAN ETHICS AND RADICAL EVIL

Abstract: Kantian ethics and concept concerning “radical evil” represent one of the most interesting facets of moral reflection of German philosopher. Using anthropological and philosophical approach based on well-known critical method, I. Kant tried to find a comprise between “natural” behavior (i.e. not regulated by synthetic a priori judgments) but based only on sensation of pleasant unpleasant and “rational” behavior when humans tried to exit the realm of appearance and personal egoism for entering a new ethical dimension based on right (not pathological, if using I. Kant’s word) maxims being able to make human beings better than they are. In the paper it is underscored that main goal of Kantian ethics is the creation of a community where religion is a fact of reason and not of faith and reason, having as main actors men reaching an high level of self-consciousness and virtue that I. Kant granted as the greatest happiness one can have. The author tried to highlight the passage from “human being” as individuum (representative of a species) to ethically autonomous member of social consortium using as sources different Kantian works where this problem has been studied deeply and gave great emphasis to story of Job, representing in the best way the passage the Author wrote of. At the same time, he set for himself the goal of exploring progressive character of Kantian ethics aimed at making human beings better than they are, but not the best, considering noumenic nature of ethics hidden in the “Realm of goals”. Given such assumptions, the Author leads a debate with scholars distorting Kantian ethical thought by interpretation from Lacanian standpoints so that those scholars made

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I. Kant original source of totalitarianisms, where, in scholars’ opinion, humans do their duty both for saving their lives and express their sadistic tendencies and makes clear that Kantian ethics, throughout contradictory and complicated, is oriented to correction and education of human behavior for saving humans being from their own passions.

**Keywords**: I. Kant, ethics, religion, S. Žižek, C. G. Jung, Job, Dostoevsky

Question concerning I. Kant’s radical evil motivated scholars to analyze Kantian ethical philosophy from political, sociological, psychological standpoint in order to define what radical evil stands for and elaborate a theoretical position that might shed some light on the reason why humans are evil and how is it possible to “deliver them from evil”. Thus, goal of present paper is an attempt to explain radical evil in I. Kant’s philosophy for answering two main questions we should to ask ourselves: firstly, explain the nature of evil in Kantian philosophy (for a further axiological archeology possible values present in Kantian ethics) in order to solve the following puzzling problem: is it radical evil necessary to I. Kant in order to create a new society (if not ethical, at least, based on equal rights and punishment), as some scholars suppose, applying to Kantian ethical thought for explaining the moral origin of modern totalitarianisms from a Lacanian and postmodern point of view? Kant’s elucubrations about radical evil took a more net shape in the work “On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy” (1791). There I. Kant gave such question a manifold structure with some levels we have to pay attention to from a rationalistic standpoint. First we should note that I. Kant has not a positive attitude toward theodicy, instituting a process before the tribunal of reason, alleging her that human mind can’t understand its own limits and bonds (8: 256-257)² trying to guess what the intentions of the Creator of the world are, especially if we consider that we live in the best of the possible worlds as argued G. W. Leibniz. As for I. Kant the most important goal is to find out basic criteria for exploring God’s wisdom, searching for a proof making us able to understand the reason of evil’s existence.

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² On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy, P. 18.
Like a skilled lawman, I. Kant opposed to God’s perfection a threefold kind of counterpurposive “objections”: the morally “counterpurposiveness”, evil proper (sin) the physically one, ill (pain), and, actually, the third kind of counterpurposiveness the disproportion between crimes and penalties in the world having as “counterarguments” holiness, goodness and justice. For argument’s sake, we should underscore that the evil proper (sin) in the German variant is “das eigentliche Böse” we understand both like metaphysical evil and moral evil, linking Kantian theory both to Leibniz, who asserted that “For God could not give the creature all without making of it a God; therefore there must needs be different degrees in the perfection of things, and limitations also of every kind”\(^3\), because nothing but God is infinite, everything else exhibits metaphysical perfection in varying, limited degrees”, and to St. Augustine whose Theodicy had as cause of the evil absence of good (privatio boni)\(^4\). It should be highlighted that I. Kant held a slightly different position by which he granted for sure human natural limitation in understanding supersensible things, not recurring to highly ontological argument as G. W. Leibniz did, remarking that, as far as God was not able to prevent evil, “without doing violence to higher and even moral ends elsewhere” (8:259)\(^5\), “the ground of this ill (for so we must now truly call it) must inevitably be sought in the essence of things, specifically in the necessary limitations of humanity as a finite nature”\(^6\). I. Kant several times underscored that human beings are subjected to evil, taking for grant, on one hand, that nature within us “pursues the purpose of making room for the development of our humanity, namely, by making ever more headway against the crudeness and vehemence”\(^7\) of our animal inclination and highlighting, on the other hand, that having fine arts and sciences, involving a universally

\(^3\) Theodicy, T §31, p. 142.
\(^4\) As we can clearly understand from how I. Kant displayed his own thesis (8:258, 8:259 and further)
\(^5\) On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy, p. 19.
\(^6\) Ibidem.
\(^7\) Critique of judgment, p. 434.
communicable pleasure”\(^8\) human beings become not morally \([\text{sittlich}]\) but still civilized \([\text{gesittet}]\)\(^9\). In our opinion, I. Kant’s philosophical argument is worthy of attention, if we reflect upon that circumstance that the furthest we move toward civilization, the deepest becomes the disposition to the highest good, which, in turn, increases human forces and will. From Kantian standpoints we can support the idea that man can become better, but not “the best” because the limitedness of human being that is both ontological (in G. W. Leibniz’s interpretation) and natural, as far as our sensitiveness does not allow us to make progress in achieving higher levels of development and self-consciousness which may represent a way to detect moral law and freedom in humans. From those standpoints it is interesting to notice that I. Kant focused more on justice and that fact the human beings can get it in this world and, consequently we may consider that evil is a mistake of human judgment (in a way echoing the third Critique)\(^10\), prompting humans to have practical cognition of final purpose: the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as moral author of the world. We think that such position of I. Kant is programmatic and problematic at the same time, because we can notice efforts made by I. Kant to free himself from Lebnizian reality, ontologically and morally separating humans from the Highest good, in force of possible and necessary improvement of human kind having as basis inhibition of latter’s sensitive facets and development of practical reason because “for through our reason God then becomes himself the interpreter of his will as announced through creation and we can call this interpretation an authentic theodicy”\(^11\), coming from a pronouncement of our reason forming before and prior to each experience a concept of God. The story of Job’s told by I. Kant gives us a good explication of how it is possible to reach faith through morality because morality in such case is

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\(^8\) Ibidem.

\(^9\) Ibidem.

\(^10\) Critique of Judgment, p. XXXI: since the “moral law (and freedom) is a matter of fact and is known practically, the idea of the final purpose enjoined on us by the moral law is also determinate, and hence we have practical cognition of this final purpose, and its achievability as a matter of rational faith.

\(^11\) On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy, p. 24.
the result of human virtues, “a religion of good life conduct” that, in a certain way, reminds us of that evil is choose of a lower good St. Augustine wrote of. If we consider how I. Kant comprehended theodicy, we can come to conclusion that Kantian position concerning humans is rather positive and meaningful, as far as it places emphasis on that humans have to reject two extreme positions: on one hand, they ought to leave behind them animal dispositions for avoiding ill and pain, while on the other they don’t have to interpret their ill as a God’s punishment, considering that humans can’t understand what he can ask from us, without any attempt to disclose God’s plan a-priori, as Job’s friends did. At a certain extent, Job represents a “better” human, who put before himself good ethical maxims, accepting ill and pain as a wise man, a man having a positive (we shall say “not pathologic”) attitude to life. Such Kantian position is interesting to us, because it serves as an opportunity for understanding I. Kant’s attitude towards humans inside whom he acknowledged both evil (sin) and ill (pain) representing respectively crime and penalties, and at the same time, in our opinion, being result of human mistakes and misunderstanding doing to the overloading of sensual elements over rational ones. This element of Kantian theory gives us an anthropological landmark: humans, being are ontologically limited by time and space we understand as phenomenological frames within they live, having only pale comprehension of noumenal world they should strive towards, endowed by nature with desires able to destroy them, are able to grasp perfectibility thanks to culture and personal virtues. Can we presuppose that culture and personal virtues do have some link to each other? We shall think that they do, and from position, I. Kant pursued a dialogue at distance with J. J. Rousseau accusing culture of making humans worst they were in the state of nature. German philosopher took for grant that education and culture might help humans in their “race to perfectibility” as far as both of them are able to limit and to channel productively human vices, which had as result annihilation of vices and depravities, minimizing them for the further development of humans and society, considering that humans can be slender as tree only

12 On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy, p. 26 and further.
if they are together and firmly planted, underlying that singular might be useful for all from a singular point of view. Thus, we can agree with scholars, underscoring that Kantianism embodied principles of ethical egoism, to us are especially important C. D. Broad’s consideration about self-contradiction of egoism, i.e. “egoism is not such since it is not part of egoism to hold that what is good ought to be pursued by everyone”\textsuperscript{13}. However contentious such consideration may be, we shall emphasize that it fits to Kantian theoretical content German philosopher presented further in his works. Consequently, on the basis of quoted I. Kant’s work, we can conclude that humans are doomed, but have possibilities and abilities for overcoming their limitations creating a community whose main goal is correction of humans without any radical changes in their nature, so that evil is necessary, even if it is not useful. Thus, humans act on the basis of their own considerations, but we can’t understand whether humans are free or not? So, shall we ask ourselves, what does freedom consist of in Kantian philosophy, if we take into account this first work? We realize that in I. Kant’s teaching freedom is something that depends on inner and external factors creating conditions for right human actions, being results of motivations that may be led in action by pathologic or not pathologic triggers, so by morally or not morally acceptable dispositions. It is a matter of fact that Kantian philosophy is rather pessimistic, but we can detect a moral hope based on attitude humans have towards themselves, if they use their good will that in our opinion sounds like good sense, good judgment which presupposes a rational, i.e. based on a-priori judgment of what is valuable for humans. We shall agree with Russian scholar L. N. Stolovich, underscoring that in I. Kant’s teaching values may be imaginary and illusory due to illusion of ambitiousness, desires for titles and orders and, at the same time, Russian scholar highlighted that for I. Kant “real values are linked to worthwhileness of human activity as far as we give our life values using not only when we do something worthwhile”\textsuperscript{14}. “Consequently, we can agree with Russian

\textsuperscript{13} Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives.
\textsuperscript{14} Аксиологический подход к эстетическим категориям в эстетическом учении Иммануила Канта, Р. 41.
schorl that values have objectivity typical for highest goals of human life, considering that as for I. Kant idea of a moral world had objective reality. This way, we may suppose that as for I. Kant values are exclusively moral or ethical and only good will may have values. Moreover, in “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (1784) German philosopher attached values to “culture”, underscoring that the latter “actually consists of social human values”.

It is important to notice that values are rather phenomenological than noumenal, they directly depend on evaluation activity of humans who ought not only to choose what to do, but also what can bring them pleasure by which we mean the opposite of ill and evil we have chosen as main element of this section, because such feelings like “pleasure” and “displeasure” express value emotions (so a feeling related to choose of this or that value comporting positive or negative consequences). Consequently, along with I. Kant we can presuppose that Theodicy can’t be recognized as valid, because humans don’t have to ascribe the consequences of their action to an omniscient higher will, and, on the contrary, they have to count only on their abilities, and actually, on their value consciousness, on their ability to choose the pleasant, considering that such feeling is linked to the a priori principle of worthwhileness we have to “include in a system of highest abilities of the reason called reflective ability, a particular evaluation ability of the subject, as rightly noticed Russian scholar V. A. Zhuchkov who thanks to detection of such particular (valuable) level of subjective consciousness and to elaborated in the Third Critique principles of reflective activity, created conditions “for including them in a broader conception upon humans as subjects of culture, in the frameworks of a general and coherent outlook system”. So, recognizing values and evaluating them, choosing what is good and pleasant (morally and physically relevant), which consequently, gives I. Kant’s teaching axiological element, as underscored

15 B.
16 Ibidem, P. 41.
17 Мировоззренческое значение «Критики способности суждения» в философии Канта Р. 15.
A. V. Gulyga, identifying pleasant and displeasure with “value emotion”, on which aesthetic ability of judgment (artistic intuition) presenting arts as middle term between nature and freedom lies. Starting from such standpoint, can think that I. Kant would show humans in process of improvement and upgrading, already being under the influence of their own impression and passion and, moreover, we can say that human beings abandoned to their fate, are not able to tell inner and outer freedom, because they can’t cope with physical (phenomenal) representations of their own, being under the influence of “pathological” triggers. Consequently, the evil is the result of a misinterpretation of reality that is not due to a Highest Being playing with humans’ destiny. We think that in the work we analyzed, I. Kant provided ideas based on two theoretical pillars: on one hand he don’t provided humans with reason as their freedom reminded more Hobbesian one, while, on the other hand, Kantian vision about God is slightly deistic in such a way that we can presuppose the existence of a God creating the world and giving it laws humans have to interpret, without falling in an exaggerated pantheism like in B. Spinoza’s philosophy. The evil is a consequence, not a cause of human problems, mistakes and catastrophes, and the way to the Highest good lies beyond phenomena, i.e. inside humans themselves, as Job’s history shown. So how is it possible to support thesis that radical evil can be used as “theoretical basis” for totalitarianism and “Jacobin terror”? Many scholars with radically different approaches to I. Kant used as cornerstone for their attack against “radical evil” a quite complicated and suggestive Kantian work like “Religion within the boundaries of mere reason”. We have already pointed out that evil (sin) and pain (ill) are the result of a bad use humans made of their faculties, which have not so pleasant consequences for latter which can be easily overcame, using reasoning in the right way. Evil is an intrinsic element of human life, but not of it is not a fundamental element of his essence. Analyzing “Religion within the boundaries of mere reason”, Russian scholar A. V. Yarkeev

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19 Кант, P. 181.
20 Кантианская концепция радикального зла и ее предел: Этико-политические импликации, P. 6.
argues that human propensity to evil is understood by I. Kant a priori, an interpretation that found its development in F. Schelling’s works, considering that humans feel themselves morally responsible for evil they make, and, suggesting, at the same time, that in extra-temporal transcendental act, humans as free “I” “always and already” had chosen evil, because that the “natural inclination” to evil, arising by fault of humans themselves is called by I. Kant “radical” (inherent) to their nature, taking as basic element of his argumentation 3rd form of radical evil (the worst of all, as A. V. Yarkeev wrote) from proposed by I. Kant threefold forms of manifestation of radical evil. As for us, given by Russian scholar interpretation of Kantian thought is theoretically incorrect and forced, considering that here it may be noticed that human beings are deliberately represented as evil, without any chance to become better, making humans ontologically, apriorically and metaphysically evil, and keen to obey any kind of duty, if it does jeopardize human health and life, an idea that A. V. Yarkeev uses for a further explication of I. Kant as master of totalitarian ideology. We shall underscore that in our opinion I. Kant did not support such position, because since first pages of “Religion….” I. Kant underscores that nature may be changed and the “hence the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the power of choice through inclination, not in any natural impulses, but only in a rule that the power of choice itself procures for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim”. (6:21)\(^{21}\). I. Kant exhausted the argument about the original predisposition to good and evil in human nature presupposing that a power of choice “is something that can only be acquired” (6:27)\(^{22}\), but if elements of the determinations of the human being (living being, rational being and responsible) are incorrectly direct, it leads to corruption of such elements and, consequently, of a responsible

\(^{21}\) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P.46. Kant re-echoes in 6:22: “but since the first ground of the adoption of our maxims. Which must itself again lie in the free power of choice, cannot be any fact possibly given in experience, the good or the evil in the human being is said to be innate….only in the sense that it is posited as the ground antecedent to every use of freedom given in experience (from the earliest youth as far back as birth)” (P. 47).

\(^{22}\) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P 52.
personality, because the predispositions to the goods are original\textsuperscript{23} with the caveat that “they are original if they belong with necessity to the possibility of this being, but contingent if the being in question is possible in itself also without them. It should be noted finally, that there is no question here of other predispositions except those that relate immediately to the faculty of desire and the exercise of the power of choice” (6:27 – emphasis by I. Kant)\textsuperscript{24}. Thus, as for us, it is possible to consider that evil disposition of human are not so “critical” as A. V. Yarkeev presupposes, if we pay attention to that fact that I. Kant pointed at frailty, impurity and depravity of human nature\textsuperscript{25}, pointing out that such corruption of human heart “is the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to other (not moral ones), and it reverses the ethical order as regards the incentive of a free power of choice that it can still be legally good (legale) actions”\textsuperscript{26}. This fact is important because it enables the further comprehension of Kantian argument defining the human actions can be legally acceptable when a human being of good morals (bene moratus) and morally good human being (moraliter bonus) act following the letter or the spirit of the law, but nevertheless their incentives are due to their power of choice. Explicitly, it should be emphasized that deeds as consequence of human disposition are consequences of how the law is understood, which has influence over human decisions, and, actually, over their deeds. Consequently, good or evil heart is something that comes from and at does not depends on nature. For this reason, good and evil are a result of human natural disposition affecting reason, but they don’t lay a priori in human nature, and along with this latter they govern and manage human behavior and deeds. It is important to us to underscore that in this section

\textsuperscript{23} “for they belong to the possibility of human nature” (6:27).
\textsuperscript{24} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{25} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 54. I. Kant expressed Latin words “fragilitas”, “impuritas (improbitas)” and “viciositas”, “pravitas” (6:30 and further).
\textsuperscript{26} From this standpoint it is not methodologically correct to understand the radical evil as inherent, metaphysically and ontologically meaningful to human nature as A. V. Yarkeev does.
of his work I. Kant used the word “will” as Willkür that can be translated as “arbitrariness”, “despotism”, “caprice” (6:29)\(^\text{27}\). In our understanding radical evil is not a black hole of consciousness swallowing everything good humans can do, prompting humans to accept what can satisfy their own whimsy, creating a realm of evil on the Earth (also this facet we shall study in further). Evil is radical because destroys and corrupts maxims that might be good (ethically acceptable by reason) subordinating them to those which are result of a bad application of law to incentives having as source the law of self-love (6:36)\(^\text{28}\). Thus, if it can’t be supposed that God exists, if it is impossible to eradicate vicious human disposition to evil, what do we do to save human kind? Are the Heavens empty and do humans live under an unstarry sky? We think that it is not so easy to find a solution to such difficult issue, because I. Kant gave us some controversial answers, based on hypothetical character his enquiry upon religion and reason has: if in questions concerning Theodicy I. Kant hold a deistic position, considering only anthropologic component (natural rights), in this case we can suppose that in the work we are analyzing, a Pauline-Lutheran position is predominant having as kernel St. Paul’s claim implying sinfulness of all human kind, but at the same time, I. Kant tried to apply the principle of “justification by faith alone (Justificatio sola fide) to his own philosophical teaching. By “justification by faith alone” is meant a doctrine asserting that on the basis of their faith that believers are forgiven their transgressions of the law of God rather than on the basis of good works which they have done. This forgiveness is known as “justification”. As we considered, deeds may be done by letter or by spirit of the law, which confers them some “lawfulness” whose real dispositions lying behind it we can understand and can incite to violation of laws they pretend to represent. We think that there is chance to suppose that I. Kant adopted Lutheran approach in order to lead humans from law to reason, from something concerning human natural rights that are closer to instincts (pathological dispositions) to the highest maxims allowing humans to perform their duty to the fullest extent.

\(^\text{27}\) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 53.
\(^\text{28}\) Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 59.
having as consequence that humans can gain virtues (6:44 and further)\textsuperscript{29}, suggesting that “however, that a human should become not merely legally good, but morally good (pleasing to God) i.e. virtuous according to the intelligible character [of virtue]” it is needed a revolution in disposition of human being as suggested also in the Holy Bible (I. Kant points on John 3:5)\textsuperscript{30}. We can understand a radical passage from self-love (nature) to obedience to maxims sometimes contradicting what we should choose for our safety (individual freedom in society). I. Kant acknowledged existence of sin as element of human corruption, but at the same time, such sin does not sound like eternal damnation for humans, it is only a handicap to the highest virtue, or, we shall presuppose, the highest level of autonomy human can reach, independent from an institutional (official) church. Consequently, as for I. Kant such Law and religion may work only on the level of faith, a phenomenon that can be explained by reason, considering that this latter is a possible source for fanaticism and uncritical acceptation of a Law that is far away in time and space, not susceptible to rational interpretation. We think that the revolution that religion can prompt in I. Kant’s work is not a \textit{credo quia absurdum est}, but a \textit{credo ut intelligam}: a key moment making Kantian theological meditation fundamentally ethical and intrinsically apophatic. The distance between God and humans is such that it is not important to understand God’s plan and order, to comprehend what may save humans from damnation or salvation: there are not philosophical tasks and have never been. God is noumenic for reason, his existence is hypothetical, far away from human intellectual faculties, but, it does not mean that humans would not able to emend their intellect in order to create an ethical community that can open the way to the realm of ends. The faith of I. Kant, on which must be organized human society is based on principles of political cosmopolitanism, an important fact having as consequence that “the political cosmopolitanism neither depends or nor gives rises to good wills. Rather, it simply ensures that in their actions human

\textsuperscript{29} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Pp. 64-73.

\textsuperscript{30} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 68.
being...acts in ways that allow maximum freedom of action for others”\textsuperscript{31}. Patrick R. Frierson’s issues can play a role in this context because they make clear that for I. Kant it is preponderant having an ethical community able to be an ethical-civil state in which human being “are united under laws without being coerced, i.e. under \textit{laws of virtue} alone” (6:95, emphasis by Kant)\textsuperscript{32}. Such point of Kantian explication plays an important role because it puts the question of community that in his views can be realized only in the form of a church as a statuary form of the cult in different times and civilizations; but at the same time we find quite controversial some points of I. Kant’s argumentation considering church and faith I. Kant explained as a way to the gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith toward the exclusive dominion of pure religious faith he believed to be the coming of the kingdom of God. As for us, I. Kant does not display humans as autonomous beings under a religion, even if he suggests that each human being can recognize by his own reason the will of God lying at the basis of that religion he professes\textsuperscript{33}. I. Kant could not deny the existence of such institution like church but he was not completely able to explain how “ecclesiastical” (institutional) religion with his representative (priesthood) can give humans chance to gain faith, and, consequently, should turn into a rational faith that can prompt the revolution I. Kant wrote about. It seems to us that I. Kant in a historical way tried to explain \textit{how} it is possible to realize a rational faith starting from religion we have to refuse as something fixed by Scripture and prescribing humans to perform actions that are due (mandatory), reflexing only a way people have for pleasing to God. The observation of the law by human beings it is important (plays a basic role) because it

\textsuperscript{31} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P.105.
\textsuperscript{32} Providence and Divine Mercy in Kant’s Ethical Cosmopolitanism, P. 148. At a certain extent we can presuppose that I. Kant tried to overcome both Enlightenment political ideas and Hobbesian (Lockean) state of nature giving an interesting interpretation of what he meant by laws and ethical community that we can find in 6:98-99.
\textsuperscript{33} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. P.113: “The concept of the Divinity actually originates solely from the consciousness of these laws and from the reason’s need to assume a power capable of procuring for them the full effect possible in this world in conformity with the moral final end” (6:104).
concerns the institutional Church (Ecclesia) that in our opinion I. Kant
calls to deny as institution being not able to put human beings on the way
to the real (rational) faith people have to obey in order to reach happiness.
Consequently, in our opinion, Church as such and religion as
“ecclesiastical”, “statuary” is not acceptable for I. Kant, considering that
such religion needs a revelation that human mind has not to understand,
but only to accept interpretation given by “scholar people” dividing
people into believers and unbelievers (heretics, schismatic’s and so on).
As for us, it is likely to say that such religion is based on fear of
punishment, and on interpretation of God’s word using tree “vehicles”
like Scriptures (making religion revealed, i.e. acceptable for reason),
Cults (by which all ways human beings use to pleasing God) and
interpretation of scriptures by clergy making people righteous or not at a
given time and into a definite and self-maintaining system (6:114)\textsuperscript{34}.
Thus, Shall this religion be a saving religion? Not, she should not,
because it can have as consequence hypocritical attitude towards religion
having mercenary faith (fides servilis) and pathological triggers (human
beings may think that they can be saved by their deeds and not by their
faith). Such religion looks more like mos maiorum (customs coming from
ancestors) than something people accept like a real duty they have to
fulfill. From this point of view, we can say that in I. Kant’s position
searching for a moral faith must be a free faith founded on pure
disposition of the hearth (6:116)\textsuperscript{35}, but at the same time, we can consider
that by faith can be meant the development of human reason towards real
truth thanks morally righteous (not pathological) triggers, and
consequently, thanks to righteous (even dangerous for human life) deeds.
A saving faith, vice versa, can be based, or comes out for duty, it means
that it comes from human will that must try to become worth of God’s
sake: saving faith must be rational, accepted and shared by human beings
as union of their free will aimed at completely fulfilling of their duty.
Here also it is possible to underscore a Lutheran element (faith vs. deeds)
but in a new fashion: faith is a consequence of human duty, overcoming

\textsuperscript{34} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 121.
\textsuperscript{35} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 122.
evil dispositions human beings have inside themselves\textsuperscript{36} considering that such process of overcoming must lead human being to a good life conduct raising from a God-man, as it is remarked in 6:119 and 6:123\textsuperscript{37}. I. Kant radically refused historical (empirical) nature of religion and faith giving them a progressive (theoretically never ending) development not presupposing the end of times\textsuperscript{38}. In such context, I. Kant’s lucubration over mystery of satisfaction and election play an important role as far as it deserves consideration that fact “that the human being is called to a good life conduct through the moral law; that, through an indelible respect (Achtung\textsuperscript{39}) for this law which lies in him, considering that “the highest goal of the moral perfection of finite creatures, never completely attainable by humans beings, is, however, the love of the Law (6:145)\textsuperscript{40}. We may suppose that I. Kant was not convinced that all human beings can take the call of God and the Law having a phenomenological nature, hides inside itself the highest good (happiness) due to human virtue: “virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the \textit{supreme condition} of whatever can seem to us desirable and hence of all our pursuits of happiness…and is therefore the \textit{supreme} good…happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the \textit{highest good} of a possible world (5:125-26)\textsuperscript{41}. Criticizing this Kantian position, A. V. Yarkeev, along with S. Žižek and J. Deleuze presupposed that as far as noumenic sphere is not available for the

\textsuperscript{36} (see 6:117, p.2)

\textsuperscript{37} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 125: “By contrast, faith in this very same prototype according to its appearance (faith in the God-man) is not as empirical (historical) faith, one and the same as the principle of a good life conduct (which must be totally rational); and it would therefore be something quite different….However, In the appearance of the God-man, the true object of the saving faith is not what in the God-man falls to the senses, or can be cognized through experience, but the prototype lying in our reason which put on him…and such faith is all the same as the principles of a good life conduct”.

\textsuperscript{38} A vision we can grasp in 6:134-6:136, where I. Kant quoted Luke 17, 21-22, considering noumenic nature of ethical imperative and its impossibility to be completely understood by human beings.

\textsuperscript{39} Interesting issues about Achtung can be found in E. Levinas’ work.

\textsuperscript{40} Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, P. 146.

\textsuperscript{41} Providence and Divine Mercy in Kant’s Ethical Cosmopolitanism, P.163.
subject, then transcendent freedom itself is phenomenological, arguing that “freedom is possible nor in pure phenomenological field neither in pure noumenic field: she stands between them”\(^42\). As for Russian scholar, it is impossible to apply to subject any substance that has as consequence the impossibility to give direct ontological basis to ethics, using any substantial idea of Good. Consequently, it is impossible to apply to subject any substance, which has as consequence the impossibility to give direct ontological basis to ethics using any substantial idea of Good\(^43\), because in Kant’s theory moral law depends no more on Good, but vice versa, taking into account that in A. V. Yarkeev’s opinion Moral represents only a definition of something remaining absolutely undefined, as far as “moral law is representation of some pure form, independent from content and object, forms and circumstances”\(^44\). As for us, Yarkeev’s positions is theoretically not correct, if we start from that assumption that Law in I. Kant’s ethical philosophy has a noumenic nature giving human beings chances to gain a restrictive freedom, a negative freedom, starting to work when human beings take on themselves active responsibility for their behavior. Even if Law is objective (it means that is gives human beings faculty of judging and, consequently, faculty of choosing righteous maxims) it does not mean that the objectivity of the Law presupposes a particular ethics (belonging to nation, party, State) as A. V. Yarkeev writes, echoing A. Badiou, proposing a thesis that there are as much truth as much subjects exist, denying the existence of general ethics\(^45\). If starting from this standpoint we can preliminary criticize it for two reasons: firstly, it is important to point out that Kant referrers to ethics as science inquiring upon how to make better humans, so that human beings can become morally responsible for their deeds on the basis of the maxims. If we talk about morality, this latter concerns personal sphere of individual who has to choose for himself both maxims responding to Law, and values

42 Кантианская концепция радикального зла и ее предел: этико-политические импликации Р. 10.
43 Ibidem.
44 Ibidem.
45 Этика: Очерк о сознании Зла, Р. 48-49.
represented in the Law or made by the Law predominant thought they are implicit in I. Kant’s works. As we know such science like axiology (science concerning values) was developed by New-Kantian philosophers in Germany at the turn of the 19th Century, trying to resolve the tension between social and individual contradictions could be found in I. Kant’s ethical philosophy. This work gave results that can be denied, but at the same time, we have to underscore that I. Kant did tried to solve a conflict more complicated: how to help human beings in thinking and giving a framework for the creation of a society where there is no room for nature as “evil” element, or an element giving human beings chance to solve their trouble only on the soil of physical entelechy (a general goal of nature). At once, if we take such position, we can deny the validity of scholars we have mentioned above in a threefold way: firstly, I. Kant did not elaborate his ethical vision for a certain society given in space and time, while German philosopher saw in it a way to shape consciousness of human beings (a fact scholars don’t pay much attention) using Law and education, secondly, A. V. Yarkeev and authors he quoted start from a position that is typical for post-constructivist and post-industrialist philosophy studying atomization of masses and massive reproduction as element of domination of some humans over other humans as if the latter have not yet left the state of nature. If we shall give a definition of consciousness in I. Kant’s philosophy, we’d choose the following, we can find in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, where by “consciousness” is meant “awareness of perception of an inward psychological or spiritual fact intuitively perceived knowledge of something in one’s inner self. Consequently, we shall presuppose that consciousness is a way to know better both epistemological and moral nature of things lying behind our limited faculties, that, at a great extent can help us to solve antinomies produced by the clash of what we see (perceive) and what we might understand thanks to schemata and a priori synthetic. If we apply the principle of pure reason and the law of nature as universally valid because they are inside the subject and not in the object, we can conclude that human beings can grasp knowledge of ultimate reality coming through practical reason, particularly through the a priori moral law in us. So,
consciousness, or better, the formation of consciousness is an important factor in gaining autonomy, in humans’ transformation into really thinking and morally acting beings. As rightly remarked Russian scholar Chelischev\textsuperscript{46}, I. Kant might turn everyday’s consciousness with its representations concerning right, moral, and primitive “philosophical” outlooks into an instrument able to solve by reason questions that not need a “specialized” reason, a topic by I. Kant developed in his work “Upon pedagogies” (1803) where we can find his pedagogical views along with anthropological and ethical ideas. In the first pages of such interesting work we can read that human beings are the unique beings getting upbringing by which German philosopher meant care (custody), discipline (self-possession) and training along with formation (education). I. Kant states that discipline or self-possession forces human beings to leave animal state and make them humans as such. Consequently, the earlier discipline would be use in education process; the best human being would resist lust and luxury\textsuperscript{47}. Since early age, children (but it concerns all human beings) must be introduced to the idea that they ought to obey requirements (prescriptions) of reason which confirms our supposition that human freedom can be only restrictive (selective). But, aside from discipline what may be used for education of man, for his further autonomy and liberty? Russian scholar E. A. Aksenova underscored that I. Kant complained that “he and his contemporaries lived in the époque of discipline, culture and civilization, but the époque of diffusion of morally was still far away”\textsuperscript{48}. Education ought to give such moral foundations allowing educated people to choose only good (righteous) goals”, which I. Kant defined as those goals that necessarily are approved by everyone and at the same time goals for everyone\textsuperscript{49}. Educational processes stimulating improvement of moral qualities of young people creates moral foundations and “those qualities are tightly linked to human dignity”\textsuperscript{50} (Aksenova) because child or adult

\textsuperscript{46} Диалектика обыденного и специализированного сознания, P. 199.
\textsuperscript{47} О воспитании, P. 446.
\textsuperscript{48} О воспитании, P. 445.
\textsuperscript{49} О воспитании, P. 454.
\textsuperscript{50} Ценностные основы педагогики Иммануила Канта, P. 68.
educating himself ought to remember that “human beings have their own dignity conferring them nobility other creatures don’t have”. Duty of human being is not repudiating such general dignity inside himself. Thus we can come to interim conclusion that by education in Kantian teaching can be meant basically as moral (ethical) for create and reinforce habits allowing people to be able to exercise their freedom also when human beings feel resistance of society. Thus, what concerned coercion in educational process, in I. Kant’s opinion the main problem was how to reconcile rightful social limitations and coercion with faculty of using their liberty people have. In order to solve this “antinomy” I. Kant proposed three educational rules allowing to give as much as possible independence to children: 1st since earliest age children must be given maximum of freedom, provided that freedom is not harmful for them and their action don’t interfere with each other’s’ freedom; 2nd It is needed to compel children that they can reach their goals only if they give other human beings chance to reach theirs; 3rd Children ought to understand that they forced to obey only for giving them possibility to use their own freedom and they are educated this way in order to be free and further, i.e. they would not dependent on someone else’s tutorship. If we apply those I. Kant’s conclusions to the work we have inquiring in the present section, we shall conclude that I. Kant in “Religion within the bounds of the reason alone” proposed a way to go from religion that we can understand like a difficult path from “someone else’s tutorship” to autonomy of the consciousness, from religion like something having fixed in time and space needing obedience (sometimes a blind obedience leading to enthusiasm, i.e. fanaticism). Consequently, preliminary outcome of our argumentation is that main task of human kind is to find a way of behaviour (we understand as Aristotelian “ethos”) giving chance to avoid searching for individual benefits or honours, or power, and creating a “reasonable” society with a reasonable government people have reach agreement on. So, considering such “Enlightenment” tools

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51 О воспитании, Р. 493.
52 О воспитании, Р. 458.
53 О воспитании, Р. 458.
like education and representative government, we have to pass to 
anatomize I. Kant’s devilish and radical evil in different scholars’ 
opinion. As we have already underscore at the end of the previous 
section, modern interpretations of I. Kant’s conception concerning radical 
evil and Kantian ethical system are aimed at evidencing both ethical 
“neutrality” of the latter, by which it can be meant that fact that it does no 
matter what orders or maxims human beings follow, and the chances 
totalitarian regimes have to use “maxims” and law in their advantage. 
Authors whose works we used to present this section mainly agree with 
thesis that I. Kant some way justified such approach because the 
impossibility to extirpate radical evil and, consequently, giving human 
beings full authority to perform those actions which they think suitable 
for themselves. Consequently, first we can underscore in our 
argumentation is the following: I. Kant is a typical representative of the 
Enlightenment, trying to explore Reason for giving human being a 
possibility to become more perfect that they could, leaving beyond them 
the lake of ignorance due to antinomies of phenomenal world, despite his 
both epistemological and ethical pessimism toward human kind. I. Kant 
greeted French revolution, but he was a political opponent of Jacobins, 
not accepting violent Terror they used against populace. Consequently, it 
should be remarked that Jacobin leaders tried to create a new order based 
on reason that they worshipped like a Deity, founding the Cult of 
reason⁵⁴. Creating this cult and, consequently, confirming her absolute 
nature, representatives of Enlightenment ought to exorcise devils of 
ignorance and political disorders the Ancient Regime used as political 
weapon during few centuries. Did I. Kant help them in such deal and is it 
possible to apply Kantian ethical teaching to totalitarian regimes? As for 
A. V. Yarkeev and S. Žižek the answer to such question is positive. Both 
scholars suppose that despite his disagree with Jacobin politics I. Kant 
provided for them the foundation of “dictatorship of virtue”, underscoring 
at the same time that considering that “revolutionary violence 
retrospectively open terroristic potential of Kantian ethics (G. Hegel

⁵⁴ Due to its complexity we don’t want to touch upon the issue of Freemasonry 
and her role in French revolution and Enlightenment.
firstly revealed, as argued mentioned authors), adding that “all horrifying features of revolution find their correspondence, manifest and repeat themselves in Kantian spiritual constructions”55. Žižek and his pupil A.V. Yarkeev are convinced that it is due to the “devilish evil deriving from such circumstance that as motive of maxim the evil is taken as such (Kant, 1980, 108). Argumentation proposed by S. Žižek and shared by A. V. Yarkeev is interesting in its paradoxicality. Proceeding from the assumption that noumenal ethical Law remains basically inaccessible; both authors agree that none can grant that deeds were not prompted by some pathological triggers. Consequently “I. Kant formulates his ideas upon Law, reaching full realization in political “totalitarianism”: the subject a priori is guilty”. It is important to us to emphasize that A. V. Yarkeev adopted as core of his thought that exaggerated expression of such an “objective guiltiness” were Stalinist purge being more ferocious that in Nazi Germany, where a way for surviving “was no to take part in opposition and no to be Hebrew, while in Stalinist USSR none can be meant to be innocent”, considering that all fabricated cases and confessions “were a clear evidence of that “objective guiltiness” representing radical evil. In one of his paper I. Rangelov supported thesis that “the fundamental contribution of Kant’s discussion of evil to our understanding of ideology becomes conceivable against the realization that Kant unconditionally affirms the radically indeterminate nature of both the notion of duty and the moral Law itself56, emerging as I. Rangelov argued, as devoid of any positive content, forcing subject to being fully responsible for his actions and deeds. If one puts the question in that way, we might agree with our colleagues, but, to us it important to underscore that this way subject ceases to “be “morally good” both while he accepts pathological concerns and while “he fall into the trap of blindly obeying any particular duty, i.e. any particular “false” (or pseudo-) incarnation of the Law as opposite to the Law itself”57. Theoretically, this statement leads to something happening in basic ideological universal

55 Устройство разрыва. Параллаксное видение.
56 Ideology in between radical and diabolical evil: Kant’s ethics, P. 760.
57 Idem, P 761.
claim, forcing subjects to become instrument of purpose who are still capable of conceiving a moral justification, eradicating the final judgment. Conclusions of authors we have mentioned above are not as convincing as it looks at first glance: what is striking is that those authors take for grant that from the standpoints of Kantian morality, in Stalinist and Nazi totalitarianism human beings feel that “the radical evil act of fulfilling a duty conceived as the ‘absolute duty’ is identical to adherence to moral Law itself, assures us I. Rangelov (emphasis are his). We can agree only with that part of Rangelov’s argumentation concerning eradication of final judgment and as counterargument we can suppose that core element of any totalitarianism is “telescopization of history” as L. Trotsky, i.e. a deliberate shortening of distance between ideal and real, between utopic “promised land” and reality, between phenomenal and noumenal, where the ideal stands before us like a Kraken human beings have to obey. Placing the “Realm of ends” on the Earth (let’s call it “Bright future”, “Third Reich”, or as argues S. Žižek the Great Other), a fracture, a hiatus between “holders” of the key to happiness (involving the End of the history, and, consequently, producing the best human kind we could only dream of) and “dissenters” whom those new Prophets and Messiahs ought only to eliminate appears. How can we explain such situation? First of all, we can propose the following solution to this dilemma: to true believers (what I. Kant “enthusiasts”) is promised freedom as full dominion over reality like process of self-preservation under the enlightened guidance of Reason reducing reality to a systematized knowable process that may and ought to be mastered by those who represent such principle becoming true, considering that “Reason as the transcendental, supraindividual self contains the idea of free coexistence in which human beings organize themselves to form the universal subject and resolve the conflict between pure and empirical reason in the conscious solidarity of the whole”, as supposed M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno in their “Dialectic of Enlightenment”. Since Reason from a revolutionary movement turns into a regime, it establishes a functionalized system precluding human beings from falling

58 Dialectic of Enlightenment, P. 65.
back into nature, giving them both right and potentially destructive “sensitiveness” abhorred by I. Kant himself. Violence against nature, “virtue”⁵⁹ (in the meaning given to this concept by M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno) as ability to subjugate one’s feelings and inclinations and “apathy” (non-involvement) are main tools for dominant thinking. Consequently, if apply this apparatus to totalitarian regimes, we can consider that the latter posed maxims having not heteronomous dispositions: here evil is a consequence and not a precondition of radical evil considering that the cult of the strength is like the light destroying gloomy darkness. In totalitarianisms freedom is not sacrifice like in Christian religion (in this way we understand virtue and sacrifice in Kantian ethical philosophy), but punishment and destruction of those who are different: Using violence and destruction under the disguise of the cult of reason, thus denying natural rights of human beings like atavism of nature, totalitarianisms built up a new Church trapped in spatial-temporal void where Law is understood as individual right of each “enthusiast” to deserve salvation under the sign of idea and the horror vacui of moral destruction, of elapsing back to nature. But going with this metaphor, it is possible to affirm that totalitarianisms resurrected God, a God cataphatic, visible, giving maxims (taken from nature and filtered by calculating, individualistic reason) to his priesthood that has to change the world: a good example to our argument may be represented by Legend of the Great inquisitor in Dostoevsky’s masterpiece “Brothers Karamazov”. In this poem it is told that Christ comes back to Earth in Seville at the time of the Inquisition performing miracles. He is recognized and adored by people, but Inquisition seizes Him and He is sentenced to be burnt to death the next day. The Grand Inquisitor visits him in his cell to tell him that the Church no longer needs Him, because He interfere whit the Mission of the Church. The Inquisitor founds denunciation of Jesus on the three questions that Satan asked Jesus during the temptation of Christ in the desert He rejected in favor of freedom, but the Inquisitor thinks that Jesus has misjudged human nature, as far as the Inquisitor does not

⁵⁹ We think that the use of such concept in a Kantian key is quite forced, because in our opinion here virtue looks like more Machiavelli’s one.
believe that the vast majority of humanity can handle the freedom given her by Jesus. The Great Inquisitor says: "We are not with Thee, but with him (Satan E.M.), and that is our secret! For centuries have we abandoned Thee to follow him[...] The multitude then is guided through the Church by the few who are strong enough to take on the burden of freedom"**60**. The Inquisitor says that under him, all mankind will live and die happily in ignorance. Though he leads them only to "death and destruction", they will be happy along the way. The Inquisitor will spend his life to keep choice from humanity, stating that "anyone who can appease a man's conscience can take his freedom away from him". The Inquisitor advances this argument by explaining why Christ was wrong to reject each temptation by Satan. If Jesus casted himself down from the temple and angels caught him, He would show his godhood in minds of people who would follow him forever, and, consequently, ruling over all the kingdoms of the Earth would ensure their salvation, the Grand Inquisitor claims. The segment ends when Christ, who has been silent throughout, kisses the Inquisitor on his "bloodless, aged lips"**61** instead of answering him. On this, the Inquisitor releases Christ but tells him never to return. Christ, still silent, leaves into "the dark alleys of the city"**62**. In this great allegory, where Dostoevsky by his character Ivan Karamazov presupposes that if God does not exist everything is permitted, we can see two Laws: the law of Jesus Christ we identify with I. Kant’s ethical law based on faith, rational faith and sacrifice needing from human believe in that fact that they can and must come out from sin by themselves, while the law of the Great Inquisitor is the Law of power, of cult and obedience. Mysterious Jesus’ kiss on Inquisitor’s lips is the point of convergence of both Laws, the Law of duty on one hand, and the Law of dominion of reason over nature, using ruthless destruction both of reason (as way of emancipation of humanity) and nature (as apparently antipode of reason). Jesus Christ represents this whom I. Kant called God-man, the ideal human beings have to imitate, He symbolizes Apocalypses, while the

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**60** Karamazov Brothers, P. 423.
**61** Karamazov Brothers, P. 433.
**62** Karamazov Brothers, P. 434.
Great Inquisitor incarnates “Man-god” not comprehending sacrifice of Jesus Christ which brought human beings spiritual freedom and turned into despotism for reaching a pseudo-freedom under the thumb of theocracy. Control of reason over reasonable beings is the way to dystopia, using nature (material prosperity, repression of sexual instincts, offer loans for creating pseudo-richness, eugenics) as means for creating artificial freedom under a reasonable principle. Thus, can we consider that evil is necessary to power?

Starting our second excursus we can think that we can answer in affirmative the question we asked at the end of previous paragraph. If applying evil to contemporary totalitarianisms we can give this noun two main meanings: we understand evil in C. G. Jung’s interpretation given in “Answer to Job” and in the key proposed by P. Zimbardo in the book “The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people turn evil”, suggesting that people may act in evil ways as a result of a collective identity. In our goals both works are meaningful considering that they look at the question of good and evil from an interesting point of view. In the first section of the present paper we have already treated the “Job’s affair” from a Kantian point of view, trying to interpret it from a position which admitted, even if does not presuppose, the possibility of faith through wisdom without any rejection of God, on one hand, accepting His decisions as something human beings can’t finally understand, limiting themselves to acceptance of His will. The Job’s affair becomes more interesting, sensitive and poignant in Jung’s work. Job goes court before Yahweh’s tribunal and is subjected to torture, Job is forced to find a defender in his own accuser, argues C. G. Jung. It is important to us because Job represents what humans have to become: a Good son of their Celestial Father, but, here, the point is deeper and different: why should Job suffer all those proof if he is innocent? Why did he walk his road to Calvary? C. G. Jung presupposes that God (Yahweh, a storm-and-warrior deity in Hebraic pantheon) is antinomic in His nature and hides inside Himself two principles in a Manichean way: both the Good and the Evil in the form of Satan (the godfather of man as a spiritual being, as C. G.
Jung presupposes). Genially, C. G. Jung wrote that in Job’s history there were no words of blame to Satan God at a certain extant made a bet with. Thus, is it possible to accept Jungian thesis that evil is the dark side of God, which we can never see, but it is present in all hypostatic elements of Judean- Christian religion: Lilith (the daughter or emanation of Satan) and Eva, Cain and Abel? We think that is possible to accept such thesis and we should apply it to totalitarianism of 20th Century. Totalitarianism, as we have underscored, represent themselves like a sui generis religion people have to obey, under domination of a highest principle, a two-faced ideal (as we had sawn in the story of Great inquisitor). Considering mystical approach to power totalitarianism had, the evil they committed (violence, repressions) was just a phenomenal manifestation of God people must obey and be afraid of. He is right but capricious, jealous, willing to keep His own power over men. If God is good and evil at the same time, does an “antidote” exist to the evil which should help humans in their unequal fight against such Goodness? C. G. Jung gives us an interesting answer to such question: if Job, as C. G. thinks, represents wisdom, something that is in God as part of Himself, eternally existing and preexisting to the World, we can consider him, Job, a valid representative of humans having to grasp virtue (in Kantian interpretation of this world) for becoming the God-man we have already written of? As for us, we can think that Job represents both virtue in a Kantian way, and one of the emanations of eternal feminine many European authors had written about by which wisdom represents a way to resurrection and perfection of human beings. If it is so, we can understand why God of totalitarianism enslaved and damned the eternal feminine, banished her like element that could save and elevate humans. In this we agree with Horkheimer and Adorno affirming that beatifying Mary in the Heavens it was more likely enslave and dominate women on the Earth. Wisdom proposed by totalitarianism is Lilith, the temptation of Satan for gaining earthly goods, giving men two things: on one hand, and, on the other hand, indifference and apathy, not in the meaning I.

63 Answer to Job, P. 599
64 Answer to Job, P. 579
Kant proposes but, rather, in the biblical meaning we can find in the Apocalypse. Thus, evil tries to destroy what may and can save humanity, considering that wisdom (Sophia) in Orthodox and Catholic tradition is the mother of Faith, Hope and Love, three virtues opening the way to Starry star under which beings are alone but have the force to overcome and win Babylon (we use Bible term for indicating totalitarianism and theocracy). Consequently, in such Babylon good and virtues are the evil which must be condemned and eradicated. Sophia and real faith has to be repressed as consciousness of human beings, considering that proposed by God (Power, Leviathan, totalitarianism) equality and justice are a procrustean bed admitting only one law, obsessively repeating its own truth, the way J. Goebbels used in Nazi propaganda, presenting his ideas as salvation and sacrifice of the self to the whole for the implementation of the “Great Idea”. Consequently, we can consider that human beings, being ignorant, i.e. not understanding the way they have to act because of influence of passions and for own life’s sake, accept to commit crimes in the name of ideals they don’t share, but take for grant in the framework of society they live in. Acceptance of such social landmarks creates a society inside which violence becomes standard that we can classify by “slippery slope of the evil” by Ph.

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As for us, M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno not correctly interpreted the word “apathy” in their second excursus.

And to the angel of the church in Laodicea write: These things saith the Amen, the faithful and true witness, the beginning of the creation of God: 15I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot: I would thou wert cold or hot. 16So because thou art lukewarm, and neither hot nor cold, I will spew thee out of my mouth. 17 Because thou sayest, I am rich, and have gotten riches, and have need of nothing; and knowest not that thou art the wretched one and miserable and poor and blind and naked: 18I counsel thee to buy of me gold refined by fire, that thou mayest become rich; and white garments, that thou mayest clothe thyself, and [that] the shame of thy nakedness be not made manifest; and eyesalve to anoint thine eyes, that thou mayest see.

“To be a socialist is to submit the I to the thou; socialism is sacrificing the individual to the whole”. “To be a socialist means to let the ego serve the neighbor, to sacrifice the self for the whole. In its deepest sense socialism equals service. The individual refrains and the commonwealth demands.”

Effect Lucifer, P. 6.
Zimbardo with consequently “de-individuation of self (anonymity)” which leads to Kantian heteronomy, and “passive tolerance of evil through inaction of indifference”\textsuperscript{69} In our opinion such vision of Power as an omnipotent God no one can beat is very popular in our massive culture, but, at the same time, it is important to us to highlight that both in movies, literature and alia, it seems that power tries to encourage and emulate evil with the consequent heroization of the latter as source of justification for violence towards some categories of citizens and isolation of others as a form of defense for them. An interesting confirm to our hypothesis we can find in E. Canetti’s work “Crowds and Power”. E. Canetti draws a parallel between ruling and paranoia, considering that the ruler “On the questioner the effect is a feeling of enhanced power. He enjoys this and consequentially asks more and more questions; every answer he receives is an act of submission. Personal freedom consists largely in having a defense against questions. The most blatant tyranny is the one which asks the most blatant questions”\textsuperscript{70}. Answer of the ruler is the answer granting safety and responding to basic instinct and desire of individuals dissolving in the crowd. Consequently, if the answer of the ruler needs blood of someone, the group of individuals sharing same needs of each member of that crowd will blindly obey rulers, considering that it is not his/her hand hitting enemies, but general and common desire and, thus, crime will be an act of submission, actually covering ruler’s will of getting rid of his own rivals. Power in form of control over natural and instinctive needs of people creates its reality (both phenomenal and noumenal) on whose basis it is much easier take control over body and mind (that we treat here in Kantian meaning). Freedom becomes liberty (as way to uphold natural rights) and human beings accept over themselves a guide (a Fuhrer, a Duce, or everyone they want) who represents for them a gate to the other side of consciousness and reality while they receive only pleasure and pain as stimuli like poisoning of their lives. This power is present in some aspects of our modern society, where the “grey totalitarianism” of postmodern and poststructuralist

\textsuperscript{69} Effect Lucifer, P. 21. 
\textsuperscript{70} Crowds and power, P. 258.
ideology shallows and absorbs personality, because of that fact that human beings delegate to society the way the latter can and must their defend, but, actually, dominate and dehumanize. Consequently, for us issues of scholars seeing in I. Kant’s ethical theory and teaching a suggestion to commit evil because goal of human beings is obey for fulfilling moral duty everyone has to are methodologically and theoretically puzzling if we pay attention to that fact that despite his contradictions German philosopher suggested and encouraged a social model presupposing convergence between human beings working on their own improvement, trying to transform not acceptable features of character or some defects into virtues that can be socially acceptable and useful for society.

At the end of our paper, we can confirm that I. Kant’s vision concerning human beings is not positive; it is progressive and multi-stage, being human beings a blend of rational and natural, egoistic and altruistic aspirations, and in large part re-echoes N. Machiavelli’s views concerning humans, considering that Italian thinker and philosopher was convinced that humans must aim at some goals and strive after them. N. Machiavelli transferred such goals in the field of human self-improvement of personality. Reaching prefixed goals give chance to realize ideals and develop best moral quality hidden in humans, especially what concerns “honor”, having inside itself many other qualities innate in humans. Common feature of both thinkers is that humans are bad for their nature, but they must be able to manage themselves if they have the right mean to do it: a mean having a specimen of its own in Stoic triad: logics, nature and ethics. If men are able to think properly (give right synthetic a priori judgments – get right maxims), you may overcome nature (i.e. egoism of your nature, their interest) they can reach a new level of consciousness leading them to ethics as usual habit of moral behavior. In this feature we see the greatness and perspective potential of I. Kant’s ethics which are a way to correct human nature and make it better. Epigraph of our work may be Spinoza’s utterance71: Sedulo curavi humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari,

71 Tractatus politicus, P. 3.
sed intelligere, and this intelligere (comprehend – understand) we consider the main and basic value in Kantian ethics.

**General issues**

Kantian anthropological and theological views are aimed at considering human misfortunes and tribulations as results of evil humans caused themselves by ignorance, following their material interest, without any rational maxims they might use for mitigating sin (ethical evil) and ill (physical pain). At a certain extent, humans are still in a state of nature, where only natural rights must be satisfied. Consequently, the intelligibility of humans’ action is still based on physical teleology and the possible perfection is not yet the much possible perfection can be grasped using right (not pathological) maxims, which along with education and laws makes human go towards emancipation from physical (phenomenal) world to ethic world, two ways humans have to overcome the radical evil rooted in their nature. Evil is radical as far as humans are not able to win inside themselves bad intentions of their behavior they ought to escape from. The work “Religion within the bounds of reason alone” displays Kant’s goal is finding a way to faith as expression of good will and duty of human beings to themselves, avoiding interpretation given by clergy as holders of Law and truth, having right to punishing whom those don’t obey law or presupposing obedience even when it defies common sense. Consequently, we can suppose that religion may ask humans being to commit actions that are not ethically and morally approvable, but just the fulfillment of an order none can’t deny, which, on its part, is not able to extirpate evil from human nature, or, at least, mitigate it. In this case, human beings don’t follow the spirit, but the letter of the law, and can “merge” their evil dispositions, avoiding punishment. The solution to this question is acquisition of faith based not on sensitiveness being source of “heteronymous” maxims, but on good will of humans able to create a community (Church) using their duty, which leads humans beings to consciousness of highest values (the love of the Law) and make them capable to act on the basis of righteous maxims
and to gain autonomy (education of the Self, as we have presupposed, also can help people in this difficult fight). In this context, Law becomes an absolute (independent from human dispositions) ideal people have to follow to get happiness having as base virtue, deriving from duty.

**Problematic issues**

Considering the above mentioned conclusions, we shall propose some problematic issues concerning Kantian ethical teaching: Kant did not solve complex question concerning good and evil in humans, leaving humans the discretion both of “developing” (evolving) towards civilized humanity and of remaining brutes, excepting Deity from this hard task. For us it is not so clear how much are strong individuals to pass on the bright side of reason (like Job) and continue their path to a reason able to orient human on rational faculty of judgment able to put on another level human consciousness (an important factor we have to pay close attention to) right to ethical one. Moreover, I. Kant did not clarify (did not fully display) the ways human beings can come to love of Law, even if it use a progressive criterion of development that at a certain extent makes this passage intelligible. Another difficult element in “Religion within the bounds of reason alone” is the explication of counterfeit leading human people to enthusiasm (fanaticism) arising from delusion of religion. In our opinion, I. Kant partially failed in explicating the passage from the sensible (sensitiveness) to consciousness, because he did not point out how sensitiveness can be put under a rational (not intuitive) schema for issuing of a priori synthetic judgments (elaboration of righteous, autonomous, maxims).

**Further explications**

Considering above mentioned, can we consider that I. Kant’s Law is a way to force human beings to obey any order, any power without any consequence for their consciousness as if we say: I did it; it means I obey and fulfilled my duty, so I deserve a prize for my
devotion to the power? We think that it is not possible because faith presupposes responsibility by which human beings can risk their lives. Our task in the following section will be explaining some obscure points of I. Kant’s theory used by some scholars for making German philosopher the master of evil will obeying for fear the power.

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EMILIJANO METINI

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POD BEZZVEZDANIM NEBOM:
KANTIJANSKA ETIKA I RADIKALNO ZLO

Sažetak: Kantijanska etika i pojam o „radikalnom zlu“ predstavlja jedan od najinteresantnijih aspekata moralne refleksije nemačkog filozofa. Koristeći antropološki i filozofski pristup zasnovan na dobro poznatoj kritičkoj metodi, Kant je pokušao da pronađe kompromis između „prirodnog“ ponašanja, tj. onog koje nije vođeno sintetičkim apriornim sudovima, već je zasnovano samo na osećaju prijatnog ili neprijatnog, i „umskog“ ponašanja kojim ljudi nastoje da napuste oblast pojave i ličnog egoizma radi stupanja u novu etičku dimenziju zasnovanu na pravim (ne patološkim, ako bi se koristile Kantove reči) maksimama koje su u stanju da ljudska bića učine boljim nego što jesu. U radu se naglašava da glavni cilj kantovske etike jeste stvaranje zajednice u kojoj je religija činjenica uma, a ne vere i uma, imajući kao glavne aktere ljude koji dostižu visoki stupanj samosvesti i vrline koju je Kant smatrao najvećom srećom koju se može imati. Autor je pokušao da istakne prelaz od „ljudskog bića“ kao individuuma (predstavnika vrste) ka etički autonomnom članu društvenog udruženja koristeći kao izvore različite kantovske spise usmerene ka činjenju ljudskih bića boljim nego što jesu, ali ne najboljih, uzimajući u obzir noumensku prirodu etike skrivene u „carstvu svrha“. S obzirom na takve pretpostavke, autor raspravlja s istraživačima koji narušavaju kantovsku etičku misao tumačeći je s lakanovskih stanovišta, čime ti istraživači Kanta čine prvobitnim izvorom totalitarizma, gde, po njihovom mišljenju, ljudi čine ono što im nalaže dužnost i radi spašavanja svojih života i zarad izražavanja svojih sadističkih tendencija, i jasno pokazuje da kantovska etika – protivrečna i složena – jeste orijentisana ka ispravljanju i obrazovanju ljudskog ponašanja radi spašavanja ljudskog bića od njegovih vlastitih strasti.

Ključne reči: I. Kant, etika, religija, S. Žižek, K. G. Jung, Jov, Dostojevski