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UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY OF DANTE ALIGHIERI AND
IMMANUEL KANT
(PART I)

To the memory of Professor S. Marcucci

Abstract: Ideals of universal power able to manage and solve social and ethical (religious) questions as many ways to reach the highest wisdom, and consequently, fullest well-being of humankind to reach a perpetual peace are present throughout human history so that we can find these ideals in Plato’s Republic, in Aristotle’s Politeia and other works concerning the establishment of more or less utopic “states” and commonwealth since our days. In the present essay we shall scrutinize the universalistic vision of Italian thinker Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) and the cosmopolitan idea of German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). We decided to analyze the political philosophy of those thinkers on the following grounds: on one hand, D. Alighieri took as the basis of his rumination Roman Empire that having as solid basis of its universalistic ideology Right of every Roman citizen (lying on the observance of religious and civil obligations), and the so-called *pax romana*², a

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² The *Pax Romana* (Latin for "Roman Peace") is a roughly 200-year-long time span lasting from accession of Caesar Augustus, founder of the Empire (27 BC) to the death of Marcus Aurelius (180 AD) identified as a period and golden age of

theoretical ground on which D. Alighieri would create a *communitas* a secular led by Reason commonwealth, which might have replaced the so-called *humanitas* (in Augustinian understanding of such idea); and, on the other hand, I. Kant tried to explain how human self-improvement under the right use of Reason (that we understand like ethical ruling principle of humankind) can be achieved to lead human beings from the state of nature (a semi-brutal one) to the state of reason, which would have as final end a perpetual peace in a universal republic. On those bases we shall try to detect common theoretical and ideal features between D. Alighieri and I. Kant's vision, so to prove that universalistic power is not a despotic power, but a unifying power under ethical and spiritual principles of the whole humankind.

Keywords: I. Kant, D. Alighieri, universalism, *communitas*, *humanitas*, freedom, politics, *De Monarchia*, Perpetual peace, H. Arendt, É. De la Boétie

SECTION I: DANTE, UNIVERSAL EMPIRE AS WAY TO REACH IDEAL STATE OF HUMANKIND

Dante Alighieri's universalistic vision was very peculiar and original as far as his vision was a *sui generis* approach on the political arena of that time to solve conflicts between Church and Holy Roman Empire, both pretending to be the hair of Roman Empire, the further in force of the so called "Donatio Constantini" (Donation of Constantine) sought to take control over political and spiritual life of Christian Europe³ and claiming to hold in its hands sword of spiritual and temporal power, a fight whose most dramatic consequences were hierocratic doctrine laying at the base of

increased as well as sustained Roman imperialism, order, prosperous stability, hegemonial power and expansion, despite several revolts and internal political riots.

³ The Donation of Constantine (Latin: *Donatio Constantini*) is a forged Roman imperial decree by which the 4th-century emperor Constantine the Great supposedly transferred authority over Rome and the western part of the Roman Empire to the Pope. Composed probably in the 8th century, it was used, especially in the 13th century, in support of claims of political authority by the papacy.[1] In many of the existing manuscripts (handwritten copies of the document), including the oldest one, the document bears the title *Constitutum domini Constantini imperatoris*. The Donation of Constantine was included in the 9th-century collection Pseudo-Isidorean Decretals. Lorenzo Valla, an Italian Catholic priest, and Renaissance humanist is credited with first exposing the forgery with solid philological arguments in 1439–1440, although the document's authenticity had been repeatedly contested since 1001.

“*Dictatus papae*” by Pope Gregory VII⁴ (1075), and Investiture controversy suspended by Concordat of Worms in 1122. A more sophisticated hierocratic policy held Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) who by the allegory of the Sun and the Moon strengthened conceptual frameworks of his hierocratic vision. In this allegory we can find in Book of Genesis, the Sun represents itself as authentic spiritual (ecclesiastic) authority while civil, political, and secular power are represented by the Moon, which meant that without the Church the Empire has only symbolic and intended supreme civil, having theoretically received his authority from the Church itself. This way, Innocent III would underscore his supremacy and *plenitudo potestatis*⁵ (Highest authority) of the Pope, confirmed by pope Boniface VIII with the bulla “*Unam sanctam*” (1302).

⁴ Articles One, Three and Eight of “*Dictatus*” leave no doubt about desire of Church to control any aspect of political and spiritual life, this way trying to pose the two swords, inherited from St. Peter and from Constantin the Great only in the hands of the Pope. The Roman Church was founded solely by God (art. #1), Only the Pope can with right be called “Universal” (art. #2), He alone may use the Imperial Insignia (art. #8). Hierocratic doctrine assumed that the Pope had in his hand sword of spiritual power and temporal power, the further given him by Jesus Christ through St. Peter, and the latter inherited by Constantine the Great, at the time was thought to have donated a part of Empire to Pope Sylvester, fact that, quite automatically made the Pope heir and successor of the Emperor.

⁵ Innocent III re-affirmed the primacy of the Pope's authority over civil powers in his letter dd. November 3, 1198:

To the noble man Acerbus and to the other leaders of Tuscany and of the Duchy. Just as God, founder of the universe, has constituted two large luminaries in the firmament of Heaven, a major one to dominate the day and a minor one to dominate the night, so he has established in the firmament of the Universal Church, which is signified by the name of Heaven, two great dignities, a major one to preside – so to speak – over the days of the souls, and a minor one to preside over the nights of the bodies. They are the Pontifical authority and the royal power. Thus, as the moon receives its light from the sun and for this very reason is minor both in quantity and in quality, in its size and in its effect, so the royal power derives from the Pontifical authority the splendour of its dignity, the more of which is inherent in it, the less is the light with which it is adorned, whereas the more it is distant from its reach, the more it benefits in splendour. Both these powers or leaderships have had their seat established in Italy, which country consequently obtained the precedence over all provinces by Divine disposition. And therefore, as it is lawful that we should extend the watchfulness of our providence to all provinces, we must especially and with paternal solicitude provide for Italy where the foundation of the Christian religion has been set up and where the pre-eminence of the priesthood and kingship stands prominent through the primacy of the Apostolic See.

Consequently, it is not so hard to stress that D. Alighieri's "De Monarchia" was an attempt to overcome such situation presupposing that Empire should have solved cogent political and spiritual questions of his time. Firstly, we want to notice that Italian thinker did not aspire to a caesaropapistic utopia Th. Hobbes dreamt of a few centuries later. More likely, D. Alighieri meditated on the creation of a political community lead by Reason and Justice, two elements, which ought to be fundamental values of the future *civilitas* whose ideals nourished D. Alighieri's vision. Italian thinker borrowed "from the Church its ideal of a universal Christendom and to secularize it", as rightly É. Gilson argued⁶, polemically adding that the secularization was impossible without establishing philosophy as the basis of the universal community of mankind. Thanks to secularization, D. Alighieri opened to human beings the consciousness of self, revealed them a new ontological dimension transcending narrow borders of medieval outlook presupposing that beatitude and happiness man can reach only in afterlife. D. Alighieri tried to point out that mortal condition is surpassed, transformed in something different which necessitates humans being to communize their *individual reason*, as suggested Th. Aquinas quoted by É. Gilson⁷ (emphasis added by us), so that, from an Aristotelian standpoint, the individual and the humankind are invested with spiritual power, and communicate with active intellect. As noticed C. Lefort, "Discursive knowledge places humans beneath angles, in whom being and knowledge are the same, but allow them *to orientate themselves towards a goal which is proper to them, namely the perfection of the mortal state*"⁸ (emphasis added by us). Hence, we can understand that the final goal of humankind is happiness (we may call it eudaimonia) as far as it presupposes both moral and social flourishing of people that ought to be result of how they turn speculative thoughts into action, "to reason about matter over which their will does have power"⁹. Hence, we can notice that the dignity of Man as individual *participating of the universal* takes shape, the border between particular and universal collapses, and the idea of *civilitas* as opposite and

⁶ *Dante the philosopher*, P. 166.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Dante's Modernity. An introduction to the Monarchia*, P. 6.

⁹ *Dante's Modernity. An introduction to the Monarchia*, P. 11

pendant to *humanitas* arose, as far as ultimate end of humanity is the intellective power of virtue, about which D. Alighieri wrote quite clearly in “De Monarchia” I, iii, 8¹⁰. At the same time, we would add that intellective power is not only speculative; it has also a practical part that is an extension of the former, if we consider that D. Alighieri tried to find a compromise between *logos* and *phronesis*, taking as core of his argumentation only the four cardinal virtues (Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Justice), which must contribute to moral improvement of society. This way it is possible to create a *humana civilitas*, an entity, which is more complex and articulated than any other form of state as noticed E. Kantorowicz. The scholar argued that *humanitas* is “qualitatively, the truly human behaviour; and it meant, quantitatively, the whole human race”; i.e. each man, quantitatively, contributes to the perfection of *humanitas*, and, quantitatively (morally and practically) so that they become the “One man, a single all-embracing community, a universal body corporate, or ‘some totality (*quoddam totum*)’, the *humana civilitas* as well”¹¹. This One man turns into a body that both E. Kantorowicz and C. Lefort call Adam’s body, a mystical secularized, we want to add *political* body. In D. Alighieri’s vision, this *Novus Adam* (New Adam) who is opposed to *Vetus Adam* (Old Adam), a theological vision by which the latter is the representative of vices while the new Adam is Christ manifesting Himself as holder of Theological and Cardinal virtues in one body. As for D. Alighieri, only Emperor could have been the New Adam capable of leading humankind to terrestrial paradise without the intercession and grace of the church¹², following St. Th. Aquinas

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And since that potentiality cannot be fully actualized at once in any one individual or in any one of the particular social groupings [...], there must needs be a vast number of individual people in the human race, through whom the whole of this potentiality can be actualized

Et quia potentia ista per unum hominem seu per particularem communitatum superius distinctarum tota simul in actum reduci non potest necesse est multitudinem esse in humano genere per quem quidem tota potentia accuetur.

¹¹ *The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, P. 467. 468.

¹² *The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, P. 469-470.

by whom “political society governed by *one alone* was the most appropriate model for ensuring the cooperation of human beings granted reason for their survival”¹³. This kind of question is crucial considering that for D. Alighieri the Emperor had to fulfil a mission given by Providence, whose signs can be seen under the rule of Octavianus Augustus, the best emperor of Ancient world, under whose rule the Saviour of the world was born. It means that the Emperor and the Empire are historically and morally justifiable, considering that the Embedded Logos came to the Earth at the time as D. Alighieri noticed in the *De Monarchia* I, viii, 2-4¹⁴. D. Alighieri found a solid base for his thesis in Virgil credited with having shown that when justice rules over the world the latter is in the best state it can be in, especially if we pay close attention

¹³ *Dante’s Modernity. An introduction to the Monarchia*, P. 5.

¹⁴ It is important to emphasize that, using Aristotelian approach concerning relationships of the part to the whole and the supremacy of the latter over the former, D. Alighieri tried proved the necessity of one principle governing the whole. This theoretical conclusion had as consequence that human race requires a single monarch, being a principle of universal peace.

It is God’s intention that every created thing should show forth His likeness in so far as its own nature can receive it. For this reason it is said: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness”; for although ‘in our image’ cannot be said of things lower than man, ‘after our likeness’ can be said of anything, since the whole universe is simply an imprint of divine goodness. So mankind is in a good (indeed, ideal) state when, to the extent that its nature allows, it resembles God. But mankind most closely resembles God when it is most a unity, since the true measure of unity is in him alone; and for this reason it is written: “Hear, o Israel, the Lord thy God is one.” But mankind is most a unity when it is drawn together to form a single entity, and this can only come about when it is ruled as one whole by one ruler, as is self-evident.

de intentione dei est ut est
causatum divinam similitudinem
representet in quantum propria natura
recipere potest Propter quod dictum est
Faciamus hominem ad ymaginem et
similitudinem nostram quos licet ad
ymaginem de rebus inferioribus ab
homine dici non possit ad similitudinem
tamen de qualibet dici potest
Cum totum universum nihil aliud sit quam
quodam vestigium divine bonitatis Ergo
humanum genus bene se habet et optime
quando secundum quod potest deo
assimillatur quando maxime est unus vera
enim ratio unius in solo illo est propter
quod scriptum est Audi ysrael dominus
deus tuus est. Sed tunc genus umanum
maxime est unum quando totum unitur in
uno quod esse non potest nisi quando uni
principi totaliter subiacet ut de se patet

to *Bucolics* where we can read “Justice returns, returns old Saturn's reign, With a new breed of men sent down from heaven”¹⁵. It is remarkable that the world *Virgo* is translated into Justice, a medieval way to explain that the *Virgo* (Our Lady Mary) would give birth to This Who would bring good and prosperity to humankind¹⁶. Thus, if we want to carry on further our discussion, we can look at Emperor as an ideal principle, based on Reason and Justice people ought to improve in terrestrial time and space. Consequently, we can add that D. Alighieri tried to solve a more cogent question: how to save Church with the help of the Empire? In his capital work¹⁷, G. Valli tried to answer this question, using the metaphor of the Eagle and the Cross, representing the Empire and the Church, respectively. It should be underscored that G. Valli applied this metaphor to the *Divine Comedy*, but we think that we may apply to the present argumentation, as far as without a collaboration of active and contemplative life it is impossible to

¹⁵ Virgil, *Bucolis*, I, xi, *Iam redit et Virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna; iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.*

¹⁶ More likely by *Virgo* is meant *Astrea* the Goodness of Justice. By the way, another form of inspiration for D. Alighieri was *Liber Augustalis* issued by Frederick II's jurists also arguing that without justice can be a strong and “healthy” power, and viceversa. See E. Kantorovicz, cit. work, pp. 98-99 and D. Abulafia commenting Frederik II's Constitution of Melfi (1231): promulgated the so-called Constitution of Melfi (1231), wherein the sovereign emphasizes again the God-given right to rule of the monarch and other aspects of power regulating feudal life of this time. In our opinion, it is notable to remark what D. Abulafia wrote about mentioned document: “Here the Constitutions, obliquely refer to the circumstances that brought them into existence: an emperor who had restored order within his realm, and was now under an obligation to promote *justitia*. This word meant justice not merely in the practical sense. In an elegant but mysterious phrase Professor Ullmann explained that '*justitia* is unshaped *jus*; it stands in the antechamber of *jus*'. Or, more simply, law-making should be conducted according to principles of right-ordering; laws are to be derived from ethical assumptions enshrined in God's teaching. One of the edicts in the law-book points out how the king's judges, the justiciars, take their name from the words *jus* and *justitia*. Nor, indeed, is it surprising that the great gateway erected at Capua in 1234 portrays the emperor, his judges and, in a commanding position, a statue of *Justitia*: righteousness expressed through good government.

¹⁷ *Il linguaggio segreto di Dante e dei «Fedeli d'Amore».*

reach terrestrial and extra-terrestrial happiness, with the caveat that both Empire and Church ought to emend respective faults. If we take for grant that in D. Alighieri's vision, Beatrice represents the virtue of the Cross, while Lucia is the virtue of the Eagle, it is possible to assume that they must collaborate to the extirpation of injustice (she-wolf), vainglory (lion) and luxury (panther), along with greed (*avaritia*), and cupidity (*cupiditas*)¹⁸. The Cross and the Eagle shall open the way out to salvation from Dark Forest to the forest of happiness, leading humanity to perfection and beatitude¹⁹. In our opinion, it means that the striving for self-improvement of humankind is driven thanks to the totality of *humana* civilitas, considering that Italian thinker stepped away from Aristotelian tradition, presupposing that nobleness (probity) may be inherited. We shall conclude that, to a certain extent, virtue is something that human beings can gain and grasp under a common principle that we call Emperor and Empire embedded in no concrete person²⁰, and in active life, supported by contemplative elements (philosophy). It means that it is possible to teach virtue(s), and,

¹⁸ We can see their defeat in the revelation of triumphant chariot of the Church, while the Eagle sits on the Tree of original wisdom, which blossoms again, and the Church represents its roots. See Dante Alighieri, *Purgatory*, vv. 88 -120.

¹⁹ To a certain extent, we can say that reconciliation of the Eagle with the Cross provides both ethical and spiritual salvation, because, since the Eagle is gone, since the Empire is no more in Rome, the Church get corrupted, arrogating to herself the temporal power. This way concludes G. Valli, the Church "turned into a repugnant monster (the devil) who no more carried on the Saint Wisdom, but possessed only a corrupted and impious doctrine, a whore serving leaders of the Earth (the Giant)". *Il linguaggio segreto di Dante e dei «Fedeli d'Amore»*, P. 297. Translation of E. Mettini.

²⁰ We disagree with scholars arguing that ideal model of the *De Monarchia* was Henri VII of Luxembourg. Scholars argue that he is the "hero" of *De Monarchia* in force of the fact that he Henry crossed the Alps in 1308, reinvigorating the imperial cause in Italy, torn by partisan struggles between Guelf and Ghibelline parties; and that *De Monarchia* was published in 1313, in the year Henry died and in connection with great admiration D. Alighieri felt toward Henry VII, if considering that in the Divine comedy D. Alighieri paid a tribute to Henry VII. In Paradise XXX, 137f Henry is the Alto Arrigo (Noblest Henry), "He who came to reform Italy before she was ready for it". Dante also alludes to Henry VII several times in *Purgatory*, calling him the savior who will bring imperial rule back to Italian, and end the temporal control of the Church.

subsequently, it is conceivable to suppose that education of human beings can lead to their (terrestrial) perfection thanks education. By education, we mean a process of “extracting” (“extracting” from which the notion “education” derives) from human beings the best they can give in order to fulfill goals set by Reason as humankind united as the “One Another”, that is not a shapeless mass, but, rather, is the sum of reasonable will of each human. If, as D. Alighieri’ presupposed, the Emperor was the one who ought to be righteous and just, so that passions would not overwhelm reason, in order to turn them into a positive (reason-driven) energy, which would strengthen the body of the New Adam we have just mentioned. Human dignity and *humana civilitas* can become available only with right rulers, representing reason that must lead them to their final terrestrial goal and Highest Justice, which must be administrated. If the Emperor is a corruption-free figure whose goal is to lead humankind to its highest degree of development by Reason and Justice, to which we confer the meaning of *reason, intelligence, intellect* and *equity, rectitude, sanctity* respectively, we cannot but notice how D. Alighieri is close to Averroes’ vision about active and passive intellect²¹. To us it is relevant to underscore the unity of intellect, connecting humans and God as *one body*, which D. Alighieri tried to prove. In the present context to us significant interpretation proposed by A. Beccarisi, re-echoing E. Berti’s position that active intellect is not a disposition, but “universal habit of principles, i.e., the eternal and incorruptible first axioms, basis of each science, thanks which properly human intellect *viz.* passive intellect (*nous*) goes from potency to actuality”²². This interpretation of Aristotelian theory manifests itself as a new attitude towards humans because the lexical shift from disposition to habit highlights that the active intellect is neither the human individual intellect, nor divine intellect but, “rather a ‘*hexis*’, a habit” as rightly argued

²¹ We do not want to start a discussion about Averroism of D. Alighieri, which represents itself an enormous field of research, but we shall argue that Italian thinker re-elaborated both Averroistic position and vision hold by Siger of Brabant D. Alighieri put in Paradise in the Divine Comedy.

²² “La teoria dell’intelletto come fondamento di una comunità universale in Dante Alighieri e Meister Eckart”, P. 222.

A. Beccarisi²³. This position is fundamental to us, because Italian researcher underscore that such habit (*hexis*) “does not belong to the soul of the single (*enheni*), but pertains to human race as species in general (*holôs*), to the soul of human race, as to say: it is the patrimony of eternal truths that humanity had discovered and shall discovered a patrimony that, “once learnt by the single individual, becomes the actual intellect of the individual, i.e. the acquired intellect”²⁴, because it is not “the active intellect, which thinks (it is not the object of thinking), but, rather, are men who think throughout active intellect”²⁵. If we agree with Berti’s position that the human knowledge is universal, i.e., exists independently from single individuals, and it is eternal, we can conclude that the thinking subject is neither the soul nor the intellect, but men themselves, a thesis that supports ours supposition regarding position and apply it to D. Alighieri’s “De Monarchia” concerning the passage from a potentiality to actuality. The ideal of humanity, with the important caveat that this “thinking” is the act of grasp explication to phenomena and their essence, and it must be applied to mankind, this way overcoming goal fixed by Aristotle for human thinking²⁶. Consequently, we can conclude that Italian thinker presented us a scheme where ethical philosophy as way of investigating is the main criterion of life lived by nature Table 2 (see Appendix), where Homo (man) is individual and genus, individual and community, part of the whole body of society. Finally, as we can evince from Table 3 (see Appendix) the twofold goal of man (*Hominis duplex finis*) is use will and intellect to act following both civil laws (*operatio secundum leges civiles*) and intellectual and moral virtues (*operatio secundum virtutes intellectuales et morales*) having as apex Emperor and Philosopher correspondently. Italian thinker presented us a

²³ “La teoria dell’intelletto come fondamento di una comunità universale in Dante Alighieri e Meister Eckart”, P. 224.

²⁴ *Aristotle’s Nous poiêtikos*, P. 140.

²⁵ *Aristotle’s Nous poiêtikos*, ibidem, “And this intellect is separable, impassible and unmixed, being in its essence actuality, for that which acts is always superior to that which is affected, and the principle to the matter. Actual knowledge is identical with its object, potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, but in general is not prior even in time, and it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not think”.

²⁶ See *De Monarchia* I, iii, 4.

triad Reason, Intellect, Values, that we can take as the basis of what E. Kantorowicz called man-centered kinship. Based on the considerations stated, we can affirm that that it is possible to take an equidistant position between É. Gilson and E. Kantorowicz' theoretical positions towards D. Alighieri's political insights. If the further exaggeratedly emphasized theological (and, to a great extent, theological) elements of the question, trying to bring back D. Alighieri to Thomistic tradition, the latter strictly focused on pagan sources of D. Alighieri, a fact forcing to misjudge deep philosophical core of D. Alighieri's position. Consequently, we can infer that in "De Monarchia" the Divine Poet presupposed that the Emperor and the Pontiff are excellent men (*optimi homines*), as far as both come from God (whom we understand as Highest Reason) having as hypostasis *Novus Adam* Quarrel in third Book of the "De Monarchia" concerning derivation of imperial or pontifical power from God, it is more specious than we can think at first glance, because Pontiff ought to be concerned with the salvation of the soul, and grant the well-being of humankind in afterlife, using infused by God qualities (three theological virtues Faith, Hope and Love) given, but he ought to relay on renewal of society thanks Emperor (following the dialectic Cross-Eagle we have already written about) and the latter ought only to bow before spiritual authority of the further, as explicitly underscored D. Alighieri in "De Monarchia" III, xv, 18,²⁷. This reverence does not mean that the Emperor had to pay homage to Pope as a vassal but is the recognition of his role as Head of spiritual world. We want to underscore as well that in D. Alighieri's vision God exists, Providence exists, but human beings do not know what shall await them in afterlife. Consequently, human beings must

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Let Caesar therefore show that reverence towards Peter which a firstborn son should show his father, so that, illumined by the light of paternal grace, he may the more effectively light up the world, over which he has been placed by Him alone who is ruler over all things spiritual and temporal"

Illa igitur reverentia Cesar utatur ad Petrum qua primogenitus illius debet uti ad patrem: ut luce paterne gratie illustratus virtuosius orbem terre irradiet, cui ab Illo solo prefectus est, qui est omnium spiritualium et temporalium gubernator

improve themselves to create a society that can help to improve God's plan (there question concerning Paradise and Hell are not relevant to us now). In D. Alighieri's vision, the Emperor represents civic values and virtues. He, as heir of Roman Emperors, ought to free active and positive qualities of the individual as emanation of Eternal Wisdom of God. Italian thinker entrusted Emperor with this task, as far as Emperor and Empire represent on the Earth like Highest tribunal of human consciousness under the Relationship of Authority (*Relatio dominationis*) (See appendix, Table 1). Therefore, we can conclude that D. Alighieri, on one hand, made human beings responsible for their own destiny, while, on the second hand, he shown that a "virtuous life" can lead to vision of God, overcoming St. Thomas Aquinas' vision, which neglected role of the Emperor, supporting that only theological virtues can ensure salvation in afterlife. In this case, we fully agree with É. Gilson, affirming that "Nothing could be clearer than the distinction between these three authorities: philosophy, which teaches us the whole truth about the natural goal of man; theology, which alone leads us to our supernatural goal; finally, political power, which, holding human greed in check, constrains men, by the force of the law, to respect the natural truth of the philosophers and the supernatural truth of the theologians"²⁸. Moreover, we must underscore that, in D. Alighieri's vision, to a certain extent, God is noumenic, it is a regulative element of human life, and human beings ought to discover Him inside themselves without Revelation. Starting from those premises, we can draw the conclusion it is theoretically conceivable to compare D. Alighieri's to I. Kant's philosophical teaching that German philosopher raised in many works concerning anthropology. Hence, we shall pay special attention to those elements and philosophical positions that, to our mind, bring closer D. Alighieri and I. Kant. In detail, we shall analyze final goal of humankind, reason and human nature considering that they played a huge role in German philosopher's outlook we shall describe further.

²⁸ *Dante the philosopher*, P. 187.

SECTION II: IMMANUEL KANT, LEGISLATION OF THE REASON AS
PATH TO PERPETUAL PEACE

The first we shall underscore is a singular aspect of I. Kant's philosophy is the "anthropological thesis" that, being a *zoon politikon*, human beings need to find the best form of government in which they can display their talents and skills. For I. Kant, philosophy is that what can find answer to epistemological, social, and moral questions, considering that for him also it is dramatically important to solve question of destiny of the man on the Earth, of his life there and now. It does not mean that I. Kant had a hedonistic approach to life, vice versa, we can say that his ethical approach is rigoristic (quite Stoical), and philosophy as "lawgiver of reason" gives humankind chance to partially see beyond the wall of phenomena and perceive noumenic world, especially what concerns morality. Desire of acting morally is the pale reflection of moral law living in ourselves we cannot never grasp, but ethical law is knowable as I. Kant wrote in "The Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World", a short precritical work (1770), where he noticed that moral concepts "no matter how confused, remaining intellectual, as for instance, the moral concepts, which are known not experientially but by the pure intellect itself"²⁹. To our mind, I. Kant's thoughts are truly relevant in the present context if force of their comparability with D. Alighieri's one concerning individual reason everyone has, that is the way to enter the path to morality as developing (*in fieri*) element of humankind because "pure practical reason is directly law-giver. In it, will acts as if it were independent from any empirical conditions, as the 'pure will'"³⁰, driven by the "only form of law", as noticed V. F. Asmus, an utterance leading us to the conclusion that it is just pure reason, which creates law, and "this law must be known by human beings to control their action by a pure will"³¹. Therefore, it is important to observe

²⁹ *Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World: Inaugural Dissertation 1770*, Section II, §7, P. 156.

³⁰ Иммануил Кант, P. 327.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

that humans as sensitive and rationally self-conscious beings not ever are able to make the right choice, as I. Kant wrote in *Metaphysics of morals* (6:213–4)³². There it is valuable to notice that inclinations and stimuli, i.e. passions gives chance only to have animal choice because they sleep away continence, ratiocinity, beclouding human intellect, because this process cannot must have place without the subject's reason. It goes without saying that every action is affected by an impulse (a trigger), but that latter must be “filtered” throughout pure reason and intellect to measure consequences of this or that action. Of course, Kantian ethics are not Aristotelian ethics of virtues, as many scholars argue³³, a way used to criticize basic element of I. Kant's philosophy from positions on A. Schopenhauer's works³⁴ and G. E.

³² “The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, in-so-far as the ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty to ‘do or to refrain from doing as one pleases’. Insofar as it is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one's action it is called choice (*Willkür*); if it is not joined with this consciousness, its act is called a wish. The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground, hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject's reason is called the will (*Wille*). The will is therefore the faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action (as choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining choice in action. The will itself, strictly speaking, has no determining ground; insofar as it can determine choice, it is instead practical reason itself. Insofar as reason can determine the faculty of desire as such, not only choice but also mere wish can be included under the will. That choice which can be determined by pure reason is called free choice. That which can be determined only by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus— emphasis added) would be animal choice (*arbitrium brutum* – emphasis added). Human choice, however, is a choice that can indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore of itself (apart from an acquired proficiency of reason) not pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will”. *Metaphysics of Morals*, P. 41-42.

³³ See MacIntyre, A., *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. L., 1981; Geach, P. T., *The Virtues*, Cambridge University Press, 1977; Slote, Michael, 1993, “Virtue ethics and Democratic Values”, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 14: 5–37.

³⁴ “Since the rise of Christianity there is no doubt that philosophical has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics. And since the latter is essentially dictatorial, the former appears in the shape of precepts and inculcation of Duty, in all innocence, and without any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction is needful for this rôle; rather does she suppose it to be her proper and natural form. It is true that all peoples, ages, and creeds, and indeed all philosophers (with the exception of the materialists proper) have undeniably recognized that the ethical significance of

M. Anscombe's argumentations, as far as in her work "Modern moral philosophy" promoted three important theses, among which we take the first two. She noticed that "The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say-and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 'ought', ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it"³⁵. Conclusions of Mrs Anscombe are interesting and reliable, if we consider that she was one of promoters of "aretaic turn", literally a return to virtue (*areté* in Greek), having as its theoretical foundation virtue-based ethics like peripatetic³⁶, and excluding any deed done by imposition of some not completely concrete and objective "law", which must turn our "ought" into a "I can", as for I. Kant. To our mind, it is important to highlight that virtue-based ethical approach emphasises the agent who makes choice and acts not blindly obeying rules, but because one has a moral desire to do act the way he does, which creates a certain vicious

human conduct is a metaphysical one, in other words, that it stretches out beyond this phenomenal existence and reaches to eternity; but it is equally true that the presentment of this fact in terms of Command and Obedience, of Law and Duty, is no part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung, these conceptions lose in reality all meaning, and to attempt a substitute for the former by talking with Kant of absolute obligation and of unconditioned duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay more, is to give him a *contradictio in adjecto* to digest." Шопенгауэр, А., *Об основе морали, Свобода воли и нравственность*. P. 138. Translation of E. Mettini.

³⁵ *Modern Moral Philosophy*, P. 1.

³⁶ See Duff, R. A., "The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence" // *Metaphilosophy*. 2003. Vol. 34, № 1–2, January. P. 214; George, R. P., *Making Men Moral*. Oxford, 1993; Huigens, K., "Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory" // *Cardozo Law Review*. 2003. Vol. 24, № 2, February. P. 563–586; Sherry, S., "Judges of Character" // *Wake Forest Law Review*. 2003. Vol. 38. P. 793-809; Solumn, L. B., "Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging" // *Metaphilosophy*. 2003. Vol. 34, № 1–2, January. P. 178–213.

circle considering that the good act is meant to be done by a virtuous person and vice versa. It seems to us that it can sound methodologically proper to underscore that “categoricity”, and “verdict-issuing nature” (in Russian sources *вердиктность*) of Kantian ethical philosophy are deontologically oriented, they are based on a duty which humans cannot fail to respect, as far as I. Kant rooted ethics in humanity's rational capacity, asserting certain inviolable moral laws based on Reason, which can only be perceived by humans. Moreover, maxims human beings give themselves have as goal to enhance the process of human self-improvement that is the final end of humankind, as by I. Kant. Then, if Reason is able to drive into action human will, we can compare this Reason to God, because He is perceivable by our limited reason like in D. Alighieri’s vision but, by contrast, individual-oriented, as formulated in categorical imperative I and II:

<p>CIa: Always treat persons (including yourself) and ends in themselves, never merely as a means to your own ends.</p>	<p>CIb: Act only on that maxim that you can consistently will to be a universal law.</p>
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The formulation (CIa) tells us to treat individuals as ends in themselves. That is just to say that persons should be treated as beings that have intrinsic value, i.e. my action is morally correct and acceptable as long as people interact with me voluntarily, or act autonomously for his own reason. Respecting persons requires refraining from violating their autonomy. Now let us consider the second formulation tells us to act only on “maxims” that are universalizable. A maxim here is to be understood as a generalized motivation or intention for acting in a certain way under a certain set of circumstances. A maxim is universalizable if we can will that everyone act in accordance with the maxim. The moral status of an action depends on the motivation for acting. To say that a maxim is universalizable is to say that one can consistently will that everyone acts in accordance with that maxim. At the same time, we shall stress again that maxims, manifesting perceivable (intelligible) reason overcoming phenomenal world may have, and perhaps has, huge influence on pure reason as well, and consequently we can presuppose that influence of practical pure reason on intellectual life of humans is also a way to reach personal freedom. A confirm of our thesis we can find in article of Russian scholar A.V. Kucherenko, who, analyzing I.

Kant's *Critique of judgment*, concerning practical reason of existence of God³⁷, underscores that dualism between formulas "practical reason *learns* moral law" and "practical reason *creates* moral law" should be kept and expressed as follow: "...practical reason, learning norms of moral law not in their pure form, create definitions of those latter, using principle of general usefulness, following suggestion of the hearth, inside which this law is written"³⁸. If in theoretical ration shift goes from individual, sensitive data to general and universal, then, in the activity of practical reason the shift is exactly the opposite – from universal principle to definition of the relative maxim, which should be obeyed, and then, this maxim needs that we shall overcome selfish inclinations³⁹: Speculative reason and practical reason have the one and only architectonical principle, even if they are different objects (Law of nature, and moral nature), so that such difference is epistemological, and not ontological. The reason is a whole, which sought to reach truth placed in "Thing-in-Itself", representing symbol of unknowable parts of objects, transcendental spiritual objects out of empirical sphere and transcendental principles of reason as God, freedom, and immortality, as we many people know. At the same time, we can agree with R. A. Burkhanov, asserting that also human being can be considered a "Thing-in-Itself" as far as inside themselves have necessary elements for critical and speculative activity⁴⁰. Conclusion of Russian scholar give us chance to presuppose that both kinds of reason fulfil same functions of active intellect and individual reason we met when we wrote about D. Alighieri. Human beings participate in reason, they are not able to use being plunged into phenomenal world, but, as well, they can be stimulated by transcendental functions, considering that "pure reason in practical by itself alone and gives (to the human being) a

³⁷ *Critique of judgment*, Part II. Critique of Teleological Judgment, §88 (456), p. 346.

³⁸ „Вера, воля и практический разум как источники морального закона в этике Канта“, Р. 121.

³⁹ Kant pointed out convergence of speculative and practical reason, writing that "Now, practical reason has as its basis one and the same cognitive power as does speculative reason insofar as both are pure reason. *Critique of pure reason*, Chapter III, Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, p. 114.

⁴⁰ *История и философия науки: Энциклопедический словарь*, Р. 50.

universal law that we call the moral law”⁴¹. Moral law is “sentence of the reason”, as lapidary wrote Russian scholar A. Ya. Slinin⁴² and, consequently, we can presuppose that human beings as “Thing-in-Itself” may gradually improve their knowledge and, doing so, they can increase their practical skills and conditions of their life to try to the path to a higher level of morality and self-improvement. They can hear that from “noumenic world” to which belong rational beings, “comes the voice of practical reason as categorical imperative, as unequivocal command of duty”⁴³. Scholars argue that “Kant shows that moral is not only possible without any religion sanctions, but is absolutely autonomous and self-sufficient”, and that everyone, including atheist may have a representation of moral law inside themselves. Thus, the question concerning the existence of God is not superfluous, as far as it needs a deeper analysis of Kantian philosophical works, but we notice the following: Law, as universally mandatory element, is the result of application of Categorical imperative to human life, discovering to them the intelligible world, hidden in noumenic dimensions, is tangible and concrete. In our vision, Kantian Law corresponds to D. Alighieri’s “Emperor”, to that entity, which manifests itself inside human beings and may lead them closer to Freedom and God. The “Emperor” – Kantian law – defines human behaviour from a subjective point of view, of course, but at the same time, underscores the dignity of human beings, a facet of I. Kant’s philosophy we must pay close attention. On this basis, we presuppose that second formulation of Categorical imperative gives humankind chances to enter the real of ends, creating a legislative model, mediating the idea of universality with the idea of dignity⁴⁴ so that along with T. J. E. Hill, we can presuppose each member of the kingdom of ends “has dignity on a rational presumption of preserving them from harm, developing them, and honouring them through self-respect and respect for

⁴¹ *Critique of practical reason*, Book I. Analytic of pure practical reason, par. 7, comment, P. 46.

⁴² Слинин, Я. А., *Этика Иммануила Канта*, P. 172.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, P. 173.

⁴⁴ „Кант о человеческом достоинстве: автономия, человечество и права человека“, P. 84.

others”⁴⁵. Mutual respect, and, consequently, respect to moral law people represent another step to comprehension of intelligible world, when human beings can try to get freed from empirically determined phenomena and start to feel themselves autonomous. This moment is crucially important to us, considering that passage from freedom of the will as manifestation of unconditional causality of freedom on transcendental plane to autonomy of will as more important principal of moral legislation is that element, which allows looking at the subject as something coherent in its activity, not determined by laws of the empirical world. It is the only way human beings may freely act a fact, which permits to consider them responsible for their own chose⁴⁶, and defining transcendental freedom of humankind, which I. Kant presented as a special kind of causality in “Critique of Pure Reason”, explaining that “Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature is indeed a liberation from coercion, but also from the guidance of all rules” (A447/ B 475)⁴⁷. This kind of freedom presupposes an unforced causality, as to say, which German philosopher opposed to psychological freedom, a concatenation of soul’s representations bearing the mark of natural necessity⁴⁸. Undoubtedly, in I. Kant’s philosophy, freedom plays an anthropologically relevant role if considering that 1) freedom is not chance to act out of legislation – in this case it is a positively inhibiting factor which repels psychological freedom (satisfaction of needs for a misuse of will and judgment); and 2) freedom is not only the right way of application of the

⁴⁵ *Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives*, P. 157.

⁴⁶ *Critique of practical reason*, BOOK I. Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter I. On the Principles of Pure Practical Reason par. 8, Theorem IV, p. 48: “Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them; any heteronomy of the power of choice, on the other hand, not only is no basis for any obligation at all but is, rather, opposed to the principle of obligation and to the morality of the will, a concept we can find in commentary to corollary to basic law of pure practice reason”.

⁴⁷ *Critique of the pure reason*, Division two. Division two. Transcendental dialectic Book II. The dialectical inferences of pure reason Chapter II. Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas, P. 485.

⁴⁸ *Critique of practical reason*. Book I. Analytic of pure practical Reason Chapter III. On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason, Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure, P. 123.

maxims from duty, but, maxims shall become a universal law of nature through our will, which ought have as consequence progressive development of humankind on a contractual basis⁴⁹. Here we shall argue with H. Arendt, and criticize, as far as we are able to do, the schema proposed in *Lectures on Kant's political philosophy*. The point H. Arendt tried to condemn, is that in his political philosophy I. Kant echoed Aristotelian position that one can be a good citizen even if he is not a morally good person, so that it should be proven that Kantian philosophy has not a clear liberal basis laying of choice of maxims by individuals. Cleverly using a well-known passage from "Perpetual peace", the problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is that "given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions"⁵⁰. There H. Arendt reflects on publicity of power and its "secreticy" to Kantian political philosophy, and, at the same time, American philosopher wanted to formulate that freedom as such it is impossible, or at least, is restricted by power, if assuming that all maxims must be public (publicity of the power), so that "publicity becomes a criterion of rightness"⁵¹, and "Morality means being fit to be seen, and this not only by men but, in the last instance, by God, the omniscient knower of the heart (*der Herzenskundige*)"⁵², argued H. Arendt not without irony. If we want to interpret H. Arendt's vision, it seems to us that bad men make for themselves exception as the race of devils, a think people do secretly, while in public they flaunt the opposite, so that evil, or, at least, bad inclinations of human beings are kept away from the publicity for fear of punishment, and, consequently, "To insist on the privacy of the maxim

⁴⁹ Kantian contractualism has as premises Reason as a way to overcome social egoism, on one hand, and, on the other hand improves J. J. Rousseau, expunging these elements of doctrine of the latter denying culture and progress as a way to reach a better state for humankind.

⁵⁰ *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, P. 18.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, P. 50.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

is to be evil”⁵³. As for H. Arendt, “here it even sounds as though ‘a race of devils’ is necessary to ‘provide the necessary requirements and supply the foundations over which finer souls can spread beauty and harmony’”⁵⁴. We can presuppose that American philosopher’s vision is the aftermath of a precise interpretation of Enlightenment having kernel in existentialistic and new-Marxist schools, influenced by M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno (we refer especially to Excursus in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*), and, to a certain extent, in M. Foucault’s works concerning power. To our mind, there H. Arendt tried to show that I. Kant was wrong in presupposing that reasonable (there we shall write “socially allowable”) behaviour lays on the opposite, on hypocrisy, or on coercion, and to display her own ideas, H. Arendt has submitted to a bitter criticism the third Critique, proposing sociability as pre-requisite of society, as she explained commenting §41 of *Critique of Judgment*. First, H. Arendt remarked that first name of the third Critique was Critique of Taste, and, in connection with this, noticed a crucially important fact, arguing that “When Kant finally turned to the third Critique, he still called it, to begin with, the Critique of Taste. Thus, two things happened: behind taste, a favourite topic of the whole eighteenth century, Kant had discovered an entirely new human faculty, namely, judgment; but, at the same time, he withdrew moral propositions from the competence of this new faculty”⁵⁵. In other words: it is now more than taste that will decide about the beautiful and the ugly; but the question of right and wrong is to be decided by neither taste nor judgment but by reason alone. H. Arendt’s standpoint is peculiarly fascinating as far as American philosopher seemingly noticed that right and wrong became not an aesthetic question, when human beings are able to accept one’s standpoints without any second thoughts, without “self-interest” (*ohne Eigennutz*) because a “peculiar characteristic of this interest is that it “interest only in society”⁵⁶.

⁵³ Ibidem.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, P. 18.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, P. 10.

⁵⁶ *Critique of Judgment*, On Empirical Interest in the Beautiful, §41, P. 166 “If we admit the impulse to society as natural to man, and his fitness for it, and his propension toward it, i.e., sociability, as a requisite for man as a being destined for society, and so as a property belonging to being human and humaneness

Making an inference from I. Kant's quotation⁵⁷ American philosopher come to conclusion that "sociability is the very essence of men insofar as they are of this world only", so that, as for H. Arendt, I. Kant, at least, presupposed that one of our mental faculties presuppose the presence of the others⁵⁸, concluding that what is bound up with judgment is our whole soul apparatus. There it is important to highlight that, as for us, H. Arendt misinterpreted "feeling and emotions" (*Empfindungen*), reading between the lines "*Sinnlichkeit*" as a way of human communication is not acceptable to us, if we pay attention to another question that is the pendant of the further. We argue that H. Arendt's interpretation is the result of her speculation concerning three maxims we can find in the Third Critique, i.e. (1) to think for oneself; (2) to think from the standpoint of everyone else; and (3) to think always consistently⁵⁹, which represents understanding, judgment, and reason correspondently. To our mind, A. Arendt meant by them what she called "enlargement of reason", which American philosopher linked to "taste" by her understood as "community sense" (*gemeinschaftlicher Sinn*). To our mind, H. Arendt's explication of "taste" lead us to such a form of thinking enclosing personal opinion into general, and, actually, representing a good publicity that is the opposite of publicity we have already written about. This way, this good publicity highlights two main elements of A. Arendt's reflection like "use your own mind" (*Selbstdenken*) by which she meant an individual approach to society and the world, and critical thinking H. Arendt understood otherwise than I. Kant and other representatives of Enlightenment could have done. Consequently, despite interest of such position, we cannot agree with this, considering that H. Arendt exaggerated role of society as "political body" swallowing both good and bad individualities, who any way has not right to disagree or rebel, and, consequently, to manifest humanity in its fullness, and this way, the only way to lead humans to their final end, a goal, which can be reached only keeping alive evil as source of the good as far as human shall

[Humanität], we cannot escape from regarding taste as a faculty for judging everything in respect of which we can communicate our feeling to all other men, and so as a means of furthering that which everyone's natural inclination desires".

⁵⁷ *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, P. 81.

⁵⁸ *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, P. 82.

⁵⁹ *Critique of Judgment*, P. 160.

maintain “roughly the same degree of religion and irreligion, of virtue and vice, of happiness and misery”⁶⁰, so that we can presuppose that, as by H. Arendt progress is not a community-based chose of all maxims, but is something that power use only to criminalize and repress dissidence, therefore supporting theoretical position condemning punishment in I. Kant ethical and political philosophy. On the opposite, we think that I. Kant’s ethical and political vision lays on common sense as way to overcome individual egoistic tendencies of humankind, which can find their expression in more relevant goals that can satisfy general will, without any conflict based on strictly individual motivations capable of provoking profoundly destructive social fights.

This way, we want to affirm that has come time to separate I. Kant’s ethics and philosophy from “totalitarian” way of thinking and to compare to forms of power over masses analyzed by N. Chomsky or E. Canetti, so that it should be possible to comprehend difference between “collective subject” in modern society and “individual collectivity” in I. Kant’s philosophy, using definition of “sociability” given by G. Simmel. Such definition implies “an ideal type of a specific sociological structure in which participants come together, not for instrumental motives, but simply for the satisfaction of being with others. If real interests, whether aligned or clashing, do not determine the participants’ behavior any restraint comes through self-regulation, i.e. tact, discretion and manners, regardless of riches, position, fame, learning or other merit. Neither do deeply personal qualities, intimate feelings, or mood impinge on the relationship. Thus, interests and passions are the upper and lower boundaries of this type of association”⁶¹. G. Simmel give us chance to look at I. Kant’s sociability from the point of view, which allows us to understand it like a universal impulse to progressively spread all over the world a commonwealth by the action of moral legislation using human goodwill and maxims.

(End of part I)

⁶⁰ *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, P. 60.

⁶¹ “The sociology of sociability”. *American journal of sociology*, 553, 254-261.

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APPENDIX

Table 1. (This material can be found in É. Gilson's *Dante the philosopher*)




Table 2. (This material can be found in É. Gilson's *Dante the philosopher*)





Table 3. (This material can be found in É. Gilson's *Dante the philosopher*)

EMILIJANO METINI

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UNIVERZALNI PRINCIPI U POLITIČKOJ FILOZOFIJI
DANTEA ALIGIJERIJA I IMANUELA KANTA
(PRVI DEO)

Sažetak: Ideali univerzalne moći sposobne da upravlja i da rešava društvena i etička (religijska) pitanja, kao i mnogi načini da se dosegne najviša mudrost, a stoga i najpotpunije blagostanje ljudskog roda da bi se došlo do večnog mira, prisutni su kroz čitavu ljudsku istoriju, tako da te ideale možemo pronaći u Platonovoj *Državi*, u Aristotelovoj *Politici* i drugim delima koja se bave zasnovanjem više ili manje utopijskih „država“ i zajednica do naših dana. U ovom radu posebno ćemo ispitati univerzalističke poglede italijanskog mislioca Dantea Aligijerija (1265—1321) i kosmopolitsku ideju nemačkog filozofa Imanuela Kanta (1724—1804). Da analiziramo političku filozofiju ovih mislilaca, odlučili smo na osnovu sledećeg: s jedne strane, Dante kao osnov svojih razmatranja uzima Rimsko carstvo, koje je kao postojan temelj svoje univerzalističke ideologije imalo *pravo* svakog rimskog građanina (koje je počivalo na poštovanju religijskih i građanskih dužnosti), te tzv. *pax romana*⁶², teorijsko tlo na kojem bi Dante gradio sekularnu *communitas* vođenu umskim zajedničkim dobrom, a koja je mogla zameniti tzv. *humanitas* (u avgustinovskom shvatanju takve ideje); s druge strane, Kant je pokušao da objasni kako se može postići da samopoboljšanje pod ispravnom upotrebom uma (koji mi shvatamo kao etički vladajući princip ljudskog roda) vodi ljudska bića od prirodnog (onog poluzverskog) do umskog stanja, koje bi kao završni cilj imalo večni mir u

⁶² *Pax romana* (latinski izraz za „rimski mir“) vremenski je raspon dug oko dve stotine godina koji traje od stupanja na vlast Cezara Avgusta, utemeljitelja Carstva (27. god. p. n. e.) do smrti Marka Aurelija (180. n. e.) i koji se smatra zlatnim dobom uzraslog i održanog rimskog imperijalizma, poretka, prosperitetne stabilnosti, hegemonijske moći i ekspanzije, uprkos nekolicini pobuna i unutrašnjih političkih nemira.

univerzalnoj republici. Na tim osnovama pokušaćemo da utvrdimo zajedničke teorijske i idealne odlike Danteovih i Kantovih pogleda, kako bismo dokazali da univerzalistička moć nije despotska, već ujedinjujuća moć pod etičkim i duhovnim principima čitavog čovečanstva.

Ključne reči: I. Kant, D. Aligijeri, univerzalizam, *communitas*, *humanitas*, sloboda, politika, *De Monarchia*, Večni mir, H. Arent, E. De La Boetije

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