@article{VLAŠKI_2022, title={KANT’S CONCEPT OF ALTERATION}, volume={18}, url={https://arhe.ff.uns.ac.rs/index.php/arhe/article/view/2348}, DOI={10.19090/arhe.2021.35.99-121}, abstractNote={<p>The article demonstrates that the meaning of the revolution which has happened in philosophy with Kant’s critical philosophy can be interpreted by the inquiry concerning Kant’s very concept of alteration [Veränderung]. The author thematizes Kant’s observation that the understanding alone cannot grasp the possibility of the alteration as related to some of the fundamental insights of the Western metaphysics, precisely with the Eleatic negation of the thoughtfulness of the alteration and the moving, viz. with the Eleatic negation of the reality of <em>kinēsis</em> as such. The author tries to show that Kant’s integration of the concept of alteration within the system of transcendental knowledge of the subjectivity one should interpret in the light of his efforts to reveal conditions of synthetic a priori knowledge. Alteration shows itself for the lively cooperation of understanding and sensibility, concept and intuition, and <em>as</em> this cooperation as such. In the final chapter, Kant’s thesis that the alteration is possible due to a priori character of time – thesis by which one also accepts that everything that belongs to the future is necessary determined by the past, and therefore necessary validity of the law of causality – is interpreted as the key for the understanding of the reasons why Kant rejects possibility of the recognition of the absolute value of alteration. For Kant, one should not absolutize such deterministic concept of alteration, for the good of moral freedom as the sphere where human finds its true dignity. Therefore, this sphere from the Kantian standpoint has to transcend every discussion concerning the alteration. </p>}, number={35}, journal={Arhe}, author={VLAŠKI, STANKO}, year={2022}, month={Mar.}, pages={99–121} }