LOGIC FOR THE THEORY OF CONCEPTS
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Abstract
In this paper, we follow Gödel’s remarks on an envisioned theory of concepts to determine which properties should a logical basis of such a theory have. The discussion is organized around the question of suitability of the classical predicate calculus for this role. Some reasons to think that classical logic is not an appropriate basis for the theory of concepts, will be presented. We consider, based on these reasons, which alternative logical system could fare better as a logical foundation of, in Gödel’s opinion, the most important theory in logic yet to be developed. This paper should, in particular, motivate the study of partial predicates in a certain system of three-valued logic, as a promising starting point for the foundation of the theory of concepts.
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References
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