WHO IS THE SUBJECT? WHAT IS SUBJECTIVITY?

Abstract

This article challenges the notion of subjectivity as a timeless, universal
category by tracing the complex and radically changing meanings of „subject”
and „subjectivity” throughout the history of philosophy. It argues that the modern
concept emerged from a crucial medieval synthesis, reconciling Aristotle’s passive
hypokeimenon (a substratum that „receives something”) with Augustine’s model
of the soul’s immediate self-presence. Contrary to the Heideggerian narrative that
locates the origin of modern subjectivity in Descartes, this analysis identifi es Kant’s
transcendental turn as the pivotal moment, defi ning subjectivity as the active yet
empty structure of experience rather than a substance. The article further demonstrates
how this modern, active subject has been persistently challenged by a countertradition—
the „humiliated cogito” or „anti-cogito”—that emphasizes the passivity,
impersonality, and constituted nature of thought, from Lichtenberg and Nietzsche to
structuralism and psychoanalysis. Finally, it examines the parallel critique within the
Anglo-American analytic tradition, which initially rejected subjectivity as a source
of error but later engaged with it through the problem of consciousness. The article
concludes that Thomas Metzinger’s recent claim—that pure consciousness may not be
a subjective phenomenon—is not entirely a novel discovery but the latest iteration of
this ancient debate, favoring the original, passive meaning. The history of subjectivity
is thus presented as an unresolved tension between the subject as an active foundation
and as a passive product.