„LJUDSKA IZUZETNOST“: GRČKI IZVORI JEDNOG MODERNOG POJMA I NJEGOVE POSLEDICE PO ŽIVOTE ŽIVOTINJA
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Apstrakt
Moderno filozofsko učenje što se obično naziva „ljudskom izuzetnošću“, a koje smatra da ljudska bića, zbog uočene intelektualne nadmoći u odnosu na druge životinjske vrste, imaju moralnu vrednost koja se ne može pripisati drugim vrstama i koja ljudima daje pravo da druge životinje upotrebljavaju radi svojih potreba, svoje filozofske korene ima u grčkoj filozofiji, i to naročito u Aristotelovim delima i u stoičkom učenju o oikeiōsis-u, koje drži da ljudska bića jesu u srodstvu s drugim ljudima, ali ne s drugim vrstama inferiornih intelektualnih obdarenosti. Učenje o „ljudskoj izuzetnosti“ u XXI veku koristi se za opravdavanje velikog klanja ne-ljudskih životinja širom sveta radi hrane, odeće, medicinskih svrha i zabave. Tvrdnjama o „ljudskoj izuzetnosti“ danas se suprotstavljaju filozofi životinjskih prava i različiti tipovi boraca za blagostanje životinja koji tvrde ili da ne-ljudske vrste imaju dovoljan stepen umnosti koji bi omogućio da budu uključene u sferu ljudske moralne brige, ili da posedovanje uma samo po sebi jeste beznačajan kriterijum za moralno razmatranje, te da patnja životinja mora biti uzeta u obzir u ljudskim interakcijama s drugim životinjskim vrstama.
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