CONCEPT OF UNDERSTANDING IN HERMENEUTICS AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

Abstract

Ever since the Aristotle’s teaching of interpretation, the problem of interpretation– and understanding – is an ultimate trial of every onto-logics, becouse it has been one ofthe main interests of philosophy in general, which is evident also in contemporary philosophicalconceptions. This paper is focused on confrontation of two contemporary approaches to theproblem of understanding, marked as hermeneutical and fundamental ontological, and its basic intention is to show possibilities of an authentic consideration of meaning of understanding itself.This undertaking goes through thematization of three leading hypothesis. Firstly. In Dilthey’sopinion the notion of understanding is essentially subordinated to the notion of interpretation andattached to the grounding of human sciences, in opposition to the explanation and in connectionwith experience (Erlebnis). Secondly. Gadamer’s analysis of understanding, despite of his explicitreferring to Heidegger, remains in the realm of hermeneutical tradition, although it exceeds it inmany respects, but bears none major significance to the notion of understanding itself. Thirdly. InHeidegger’s philosophy the notion of understanding is the manner of being and as such it considerablyoverpasses the horizon in which that notion was considered before and after.