FINK’S DIONYSUS

Abstract

Eugene Fink’s approach to the tradition of philosophy is characterized by two rejections or negations. These are contained in seemingly simple insights: there is no self-evident relation to the origin of philosophy, just as there is no necessary transition from the origin to what the origin enables. This article aims to juxtapose Fink’s interpretation of the genesis and specificity of ancient philosophy in the context of the revival of tragic wisdom or Dionysian truth, starting from these two ideas. In this context, the constitution of Fink’s philosophical position, centered around the idea of the meontic paradox, will also be illuminated. To recall, meontology refers to a philosophical comprehension beyond being. For Fink, absolute subjectivity cannot be exhausted by ontic categories; it is not confined to what exists and is visible. To be absolute means to encompass both what is and what is not, being and non-being. Thus, phenomenology necessarily ceases to function as a description of consciousness about anything. Variation is no longer sufficient. In the face of the meontic, phenomenological description undermines itself by attempting to describe the indescribable and present the nonexistent, thus becoming speculation about the absolute.