IN DEFENSE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

Abstract

The aim of this paper was to try to examine the possibility of adequate defense of Kant`s transcendental standpoint against the critical arguments given by Paul Guyer in his article “The transcendental deduction of the categories”. The first part of the paper gave the analysis of Paul Guyer`s critique of Kant, which consisted of two main lines of argumentation, first, concerning the relation between the categories and transcendental apperception, which was inadequate to show the formal connection that could establish deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, and second, about possibility of deduction based on the difference of judgments of experience and judgment of perception given in Prolegomena. The second part of the paper attempted to show, that these objections could be avoided if it could be proven that the transcendental deduction stands in coordination with different faculties of the spontaneity of thinking (transcendental apperception, understanding and imagination) and not (as Guyer tried to prove) in the hierarchy of these faculties in establishing the transcendental deduction. The possibility of identifying the synthesis of transcendental apperception and categories of understanding suggested by Guyer were criticized, and the analysis was made considering the particular role of the category of relation in constituting the objective knowledge in judgments of experience.