THE ROLE OF LOGOS IN PLATO’S DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE

Abstract

In this paper the role of the concept of logos in the The aetetetus has been analysed. In its fi rst part I criticize the semantic interpretations of the logos. At the same time I give arguments in favor of some kind of coherentist understanding of logos. Th en I show that from the aporetic discussion in the dialogue, one can fi nd a way out by means of a consequent interpretation of the so-called dream of Socrates. Herein Plato’s Socrates refutes the theory according to which sorely complexes are knowable, whereas the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but only perceivable. In doing this Plato indirectly demonstrates that there is in fact knowledge of elements. And this knowledge is not based on perception, but on the suitable logoi, in such a manner that those primaries are not accountable isolated from each other, but only in their interrelations, and by the position they have in the well ordered and structured whole.