TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION IN KANT’S AND FICHTE’S PHILOSOPHIES: ARGUMENT AGAINST EMPIRICISM

Abstract

The aim of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is to call into question the illusions of the great systems of metaphysica rationalis that preceded his philosophy. Through the doctrine of the transcendental dialectic Kant reveals the mechanism of transformation of the natural dialectic of the mind into a metaphysical illusion. This mechanism of transcendental illusion originates within the subject-object relation. It can be expressed as an (illegitimate) assertion that the mind enables objective knowledge. According to Kant, the metaphysical errors of his predecessors can be interpreted as manifestations of this fundamental mistake. Within Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, Kant’s teaching is transformed, and it seems to take aim at metaphysical systems of empiricism. In Fichte’s view, transcendental illusion rests within the subject-object relation, but its origin lies on the side of the object, which is expressed through the assertion of the existence of immediate experience. The author will examine more closely the circumstances according to which the determination of the transcendental illusion changes in the context of Fichte’s philosophy, highlighting the significance of this transformation for idealist arguments against empiricism.